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ABSTRACT 
Economic Analysis of Public Policy with Respect to Interna¬ 
tional Trade; A Case Study of the U.S. Aerospace Industry 
February, 1978 
Myung-Gun Choo, B.A., University of San Francisco, 
M.A., Syracuse University 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Sidney C. Sufrin 
International trade theory is based, in great part, 
upon the assumption that comparative advantage both causes 
and determines the pattern of international trade. But is 
comparative advantage really a cause of international trade, 
or a result? Or are international trade and comparative 
advantage conceptions results of more basic factors? Causa¬ 
lity flowing from comparative advantage to trade has usually 
been taken for granted. The significance of the direction 
of causality can hardly be exaggerated, since the future 
patterns of international trade and the developmental stra¬ 
tegy of many economies depends upon it. 
An economy with high technology - high unit value ex¬ 
ports is in a good position to improve the real income 
level of its people, since it can impute the rising produc¬ 
tion cost to its foreign customers. In the strange world 
of global protectionism, exporting, at a low price, is an 
unforgiveable sin, but charging an exorbitant price to 
foreign customer is praised as ’’fair comDetition." Under 
vii 
the circumstances, an economy devoting its limited resour¬ 
ces and manpower to the low technology - low unit value ex¬ 
port industries is headed for self-defeat. 
Comparative advantage theory, however, directs an 
economy to concentrate on industries it is relatively best 
at. This leads to a wider gap between developed economies 
and developing ones by further reinforcing the present state 
of comparative advantage. This is the terms of trade. 
What is correct to maintain the status quo in the interna¬ 
tional economy from a developed economy’s perspective, may 
not be correct from a developing economy’s perspective. 
If comparative advantage theory were the universal 
guide, the prewar U.S. would have been better off by re¬ 
maining a predominantly agricultural or at least a labor- 
intensive economy indefinitely, while Britain concentrated 
on technology-intensive industry such as the aircraft in¬ 
dustry. But the U.S. aircraft industry took the opposite 
course. This defiance of the U.S. aircraft industry and 
government, turned out to be the cornerstone of American 
industrial leadership in the postwar period. Again Europe 
in the 1970’s took a similar action in the development of 
the aerospace industry. These situations do not comfort 
with what comparative advantage theory directs. 
The basic objective of this study is critically to ex- 
Vlll 
amine the export pattern of the U.S. aerospace industry in 
light of international trade theory, to show that the real 
driving force of international trade is not comparative ad¬ 
vantage but the will of entrepreneurs and Government to ex¬ 
pand the market. The result was improving productivity 
and income levels. 
The goals of industrial export, then, help fashion the 
state of comparative advantage. The mechanism is public 
policy. Comparative advantage seems to dictate the pattern 
of international trade, but only on the surface. In reality, 
comparative advantage is a result of the interaction between 
public policy and entrepreneurs' adaptability to a changing 
reality. 
In a passive economy dominated by the trade of resour¬ 
ce intensive commodities, comparative advantage seems espe¬ 
cially rigid and inherent. But in the complex world we 
live in today, the patterns of trade is also determined by 
public policy. Factor endowment, which was stressed so 
much by the comparative advantage advocates, became less 
significant. A generally capital deficient economy, for 
instance, can have a capital-intensive industrial base by 
concentrating its resources. 
All these factors lead to the hypotheses of this study: 
1. Comparative advantage is not a factor which is 
ix 
vested and fixed; 
2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly 
changed by the interaction of public policy and 
the entrepreneurs' adaptability to their changing 
economic realitv; 
3. Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving 
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬ 
tor resulting from exogenous efforts; 
4. The active driving force of international trade 
and the determinant of international trade pattern 
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to 
improve the income and employment levels through 
market expansion. 
In this analysis, it is proven that the hypotheses put forth 
are viable as far as the aerospace industries in the U.S. 
and Europe are concerned. Additional hypotheses are 
suggested which are concerned with the gains of interna¬ 
tional trade through the effects on the patterns of trade 
arising from government-incustry cooperation in efforts. 
The hypotheses stress the particular differential effects 
of government oolicv on orocucticn and trade decisions. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is said that who rules the sea rules the world. 
This aphorism may not fit perfectly to the complex world we 
live in today. Nevertheless, what may be true today, is 
that one who rules "space" may rule the world. This may be 
the inevitable consequence of the fact that, in abstract 
terms, any living organism strives for ever expanding perip¬ 
hery of its existence by whatever avilable means. The aero¬ 
space industry today provides one with the most advanced 
means for this purpose in a physical sense. 
The advancement of the use of energy and speed has dic¬ 
tated the destiny of civilization. The Bronze civilization 
had come to an end as the Hittite learned to forge iron swords 
and European Feudalism disappeared as gunpowder was introduced 
from China. It is generally acknowledged that air superior¬ 
ity greatly influenced the outcome of World War II. How¬ 
ever, we should not overlook the fact that the same iron and 
gunpowder used in warfare were also used in factories and 
quarries thus raising their productivity dramatically. Mi¬ 
litary bombers modified to commercial jet transports did the 
same thing by shrinking the globe into a fraction of what it 
used to be. 
2 
Aeronautical technology and nuclear energy are contem¬ 
porary versions of gunpowder and iron. This is even more 
so because their consequences are not local but global. 
The advancement of aeronautical technology probably more 
than anything else led Great Britain to abandon her policy 
of isolationism and to join continental Europe. This also 
forced the United States to shift its traditional foreign 
policy away from the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, the 
size of the industry, compounded with its enormous impact on 
other industries, makes the understanding of its essence 
salient in any policy-making process. 
Even leaving out the military implication of the aero¬ 
space industry, the economic importance of it can hardly be 
exaggerated. To be specific, industry sales of 28 billion 
dollars in 1975 represent 5.4 per cent of sales of durable 
goods, 2.6 per cent of manufacturing industry, and 1.9 per 
cent of gross national product.^" But even more important 
than the mere number is the qualitative aspect of the indus¬ 
try. For instance, aerospace exports in 1975 reached a new 
high of 7.8 billion dollars. Due to the negligible size of 
aerospace imports, the net favorable trade balance of the in¬ 
dustry is about 7 billion dollars. This is equivalent to 
73.4 per cent of the total U.S. trade balance which was 9.6 
2 
billion dollars in 1975. Thus it becomes clear that the 
strength of the dollar depends upon the performance of aero- 
3 
space industry which is the single most important contributor 
to the trade surplus. 
Another aspect to look into is the quality of employ¬ 
ment. Although the total employment of 942,000 is only a 
fraction of the national work force of 84.1 million as of 
1976, the number of scientists and engineers working in re¬ 
search and development programs amounts to 18.7 per cent of 
the national total of that group. In the sixties, when both 
the military services and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA.) reached exceptionally high levels of 
research and development activity, the industry employed as 
man3/ as 30 per cent of all U.S. research scientists and en- 
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gineers. Furthermore, by definition, research and develop¬ 
ment constantly reshape and expand the scope of our civiliza¬ 
tion. For example, items ranging from microwave ovens to 
supersonic transports, are the byproducts of the research and 
development efforts of this industry. 
Thus it is crucial to have sound high technology indus¬ 
tries such as the aerospace industry for any economy to be¬ 
come a truely viable one. This is particularly so in a time 
of global inflation since only an economy whose industries 
have either strategic value or a dominant position in the 
world market can improve the living standard of its people. 
Energy, aerospace, and food industries would be at the top 
of such a list. What such industries have in common is 
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that the elasticities of demand for their products are less 
than in other industries. Thus it is easier for these in¬ 
dustries to impute the rising production cost to their cus¬ 
tomers than it is in other industries. Furthermore, an 
economy with an export position in such industries can even 
enhance the living standard of its people through raising 
the prices of exports. For instance, the per capita income 
of OPEC members was increased greatly by raising oil prices. 
The U.S. aerospace industry also showed its outstanding abil¬ 
ity in recycling petrodollars after the oil crises. However, 
the U.S. aerospace industry did not always occupy a preferred 
position. How did the aerospace industry attain its preferr¬ 
ed position? The process by which the U.S. aerospace indus¬ 
try came to occupy its current position in the world market 
will be examined in this paper. 
2. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The basic objective of the study is to scrutinize the 
export patterns of the U.S. aerospace industry in light of 
international trade theory. The core of international trade 
theory is based on the assumption that comparative advantage 
is the driving force of international trade and the determin¬ 
ant of the international trade pattern. The hypotheses of 
this study, however, are: 
1. Comparative advantage is not a factor which is vested 
and fixed; 
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2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly 
changed by the interaction of the public-policy and 
the entrepreneurs * adaptability to their changing 
economic reality; 
3. Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving 
force of international trade but a necessary factor 
resulting from exogenous efforts; 
4. The active driving force of international trade and 
the determinant of international trade pattern are 
the wills of entrepreneurs and government to improve 
the income and employment levels through market ex¬ 
pansion . 
In order to substantiate these hypotheses, the growth 
of the industry during the last three quarters of a century 
will be systematically analyzed in conjunction with U.S. pub¬ 
lic policy. By doing so this study will investigate the 
crucial role of the government in changing the state of com¬ 
parative advantage between the U.S. and British aerospace 
industries. 
i 
The U.S. aerospace industry deserves attention in many 
aspects. It is not only the provider of the physical means 
of national defense, but also the largest contributor to the 
net balance of trade as well as the largest employer of sci¬ 
entists and engineers. Yet due to its unique composition 
of business, military, technology, and politics, few students 
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have attempted to study this fascinating industry as a 
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whole. This may be due to the fact that science today 
has become much too specialized to tackle the task of analyz¬ 
ing this complex structure of the twentieth century. This 
study examines the aerospace industry from the perspectives 
of four distinctive factors which concurrently determine the 
development of the aerospace industry: technology, military, 
politics, and business. 
Understanding the nature of the aerospace industry is 
essential to a proper comprehension of it and its consequen¬ 
tial impact on the general economy: First, its product 
line is largely determined by Government needs and require¬ 
ments which have been constantly changing in response to de¬ 
velopments in domestic and international relations. It has 
therefore been acutely subject to variations in national pol¬ 
icy and has simultaneously had to keep pace with a rapidly 
changing technology. 
Second, the industry's products require continual ad¬ 
vances in performance, thus constantly forcing the industry 
to expand the frontier of its technology. Consequently, 
the industry draws the largest share of the country's pub¬ 
lic and private expenditures on research and development. 
Thus, its impact on long-term growth in productivity through 
spill-over effects and the national economy is incalculable. 
Third, due to the nature of its product, (i.e. weapon 
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systems) the industry's foreign activity is subject to gov¬ 
ernment regulation which is constantly changing. In inter¬ 
national politics it is not unusual to see friends of the 
past become enemies of today or vice versa. Accordingly, 
foreign trade policy regarding weapon systems is unpredic¬ 
table. However, since any industry must keep a steady team 
of scientists and engineers to seize a forthcoming opportun¬ 
ity, it is painful to follow this erratic guideline. 
Finally, as the scale of a single project increases and 
the number of projects becomes fewer, winning or losing a 
single project becomes a matter of life or death for the com¬ 
pany involved. Moreover, some projects may take seven to 
ten years from design to production while ever-increasing 
complexities require sophisticated system management. Thus 
aerospace companies are forced to do whatever is necessary 
to secure contracts. This inevitably brings about poli¬ 
tical factors in the course of development. Such consider¬ 
ations make the aerospace industry suited not only to quan¬ 
titative analysis, but also to qualitative analysis. 
The methodology of this study is mainly historical and 
exploratory. However, it is also concerned with suggesting 
some hypotheses which make the theory of international trade 
more consistent with reality and more explanatory of the 
course of historic adjustment in international trade pat¬ 
tern. In brief, this is a study of business history dir- 
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ected at examining the conceptual basis of international 
trade. 
3. IMPLICATION OF STUDY 
Up until World War II, the U.S. aircraft industry had 
to appeal to the government for protection from the European 
aircraft industry. However, it emerged as the largest in¬ 
dustry in the world during the war. Even after the war it 
suffered from foreign challenge particularly from the Bri¬ 
tish aircraft industry. Nevertheless, it was able to over¬ 
come the technological gap and to dominate the world market 
for the last three decades. In this process of growth, 
the supportive public policy of the various departments of 
the U.S. government played a critical role. Being both 
customer and patron of the industry, the U.S. government -1 
directed its destiny. On the other hand, the ineffective¬ 
ness and myopia of the British government, more than the 
internal problems of British aircraft industry, is blamed 
for her loss of the prewar marketshare in the world market.^ 
As this is being written, however, the British air¬ 
craft industry is struggling to regain her old glory through 
the transnational projects ardently promoted by various sets 
of European countries. Some of the well known collabora¬ 
tive projects are Concorde, Airbus, Jaguar, Multi Role Com¬ 
bat Aircraft(MRCA), and Martel air-to-ground missile pro- 
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jects. Whatever the outcome may be, this suggests that 
the public policy in general is a crucial determinant of 
the export pattern and the growth of the aerospace industry. 
Although, this may not be the case of every industry, it is 
likely to be true of any high technology-high value indus¬ 
try. 
This observation may have a significant implication to 
the developing economies and their developmental strategies, 
since the comparative advantage theory has directed them to 
concentrate on low technology - low value industries while 
developed economies concentrate on high technology - high 
value industries. From the viewpoint of developing coun¬ 
tries, this does nothing but reinforce the present foreign 
trade patterns and thus further widen the gap between the 
living standard of developed countries and that of develop¬ 
ing countries. 
But our thesis is that the state of comparative advan¬ 
tage is only the result of many external factors, and thus 
it is changeable through various public policy. This im¬ 
plies that an economy should not bind itself by the present 
state of comparative advantage in trading with others for 
comparative advantage is not the true cause of international 
trade. The true driving force of international trade is 
the will to expand the size of the market, thus raising the 
productivity and income level of a concerned economy. The 
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state of comparative advantage is not vested or fixed as 
the traditional school preaches but results from, and is 
constantly changed by an active public policy. 
The experience of the U.S. aerospace industry substan¬ 
tiates the hypotheses of this study. From predominantly 
agricultural economy the U.S. aerospace industry emerged as 
an economic giant of the twentieth century. If the com¬ 
parative advantage advocates were right, the U.S. should 
have remained as an agricultural economy due to its vast 
fertile land, and weak high-technology intensive industrial 
base. But the U.S. was forced to develop its own with 
strong governmental support due to the last two World Wars 
and the subsequent Cold War with Soviet Russia. This turns 
out to be an indispensable asset for the U.S. in attaining 
both economic and political leadership in the postwar era. 
Thus the defiance to the traditional thought on international 
trade offers an opportunity to examine the validity of the 
hypotheses of this study. 
4. BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Since the first usable aircraft was made by the Wright 
brothers in 1903 the progress of the aircraft industry has 
been upward, but only sporadically so. The first aircraft 
company was established by the Wright brothers in 1909, but 
was soon closed because of lack of demand. Not until the 
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outbreak of World War I was the strategic value of aircraft 
recognized by the U.S, Consequently, the U.S. found it¬ 
self totally unprepared. There were no combat aircraft in 
the U.S. capable of surviving aerial battle for aircraft 
were considered basically as a means of secondary transport 
In the brief eighteen months of the war the U.S. tried des¬ 
perately to catch up with the technology of its European 
counterparts. However, its effort was unsuccessful. Dis 
ruption after the war made the mess even worse because of 
slow commercial demand and the disposal of a huge military 
surplus. Consequently, in the early 1920's, the industry 
was struggling for a mere existence. 
In 1925, the Morrow Board appointed by President 
Coolidge filed its report concerning the future of the air¬ 
craft industry and its effect on national security. This 
resulted in the Air Commerce Act, the Army Air Corps five- 
year program, and Navy five-year program into existence. 
The report also provided, for the first time, the basis of 
a long term national air policy that brought a virtual re¬ 
birth to the industry. Within a few years U.S. aircraft 
were able to establish scores of world's records. But, 
in 1934, the industry was set back on its heels by the 
abrupt cancellation of the federal air-mail contracts. 
One scandal after another was featured by the mass media. 
Everyone concerned was preoccupied with cautiousness while 
12 
the industry became troubled and depressed.^ 
With the military procurement interrupted, the air¬ 
craft industry expanded its exports. Toward the end of 
the thirties exports amounted to 70 percent of the total 
industry sales. Then came the Arms Embargo Act, of the 
F.D.R. administration, which cut off export outlets and 
g 
again rocked the industry back on its heels. Its recovery 
did not occur until the president’s executive order permit¬ 
ting export was enacted. 
Finally, the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 cleared the way 
for quantity exports to the Allies. Production jumped 
from 2,141 aircraft in 1939 to 6,086 in 1940 and to 19,290 
q 
in 1941. Most of this production was for export. For¬ 
eign demand helped the U.S. aircraft industry expand its 
facilities and work-force, and led to its mass-production 
technology. 
Therefore, in both wars aircraft exports preceded even¬ 
tual wartime production. Fortunately, in both World Wars 
the U.S. had time for mobilization and for correcting the 
dificiencies in airframe production capacity. However, it 
is generally acknowledged that there will be no time given 
for gradual mobilization in the next war, due to the nature 




For this reason, the U.S. government has realized that 
it needs an active aircraft industry as much as a standing 
Air Force. The production phase is as essential as research 
and development. The military has also learned that new 
weapons which are untested, underdeveloped, or only avail¬ 
able in small quantities, have little consequence in the 
course of war. A good example of this was the German jet 
fighter. German research teams were far ahead of the Al¬ 
lies' counterpart in jet engine development and far ahead 
of their production capability. However, the first jet 
fighter, He-178, came out too late and in too small a quan¬ 
tity to affect the course of World War II. Had Germany’s 
jet fighters been produced in a sufficient quantity in time, 
the war might have taken a different course, or at least 
would have been prolonged. 
Two World Wars taught the U.S. government and military 
three things: First, there is no substitute for time in 
the research and development of a new aircraft. And the 
time required for development increases with the advancement 
of technology. Whereas the standard four-engined bomber 
of 1940 required 150,000 man-hours of research and develop¬ 
ment, the same type of Bomber in 1944 required 1.5 million 
manhours.^ Accordingly, the time lag of development was 
extended from four years on the average which it took during 
World War II to the rate of eight years which it takes today. 
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Second, quantity production is essential to effective 
air power. Only a sufficient number of aircraft can have 
any strategic value, no matter how superior the aircrafts 
are. Of utmost concern, is the fact that mass production 
requires a steady demand from the public sector for business 
in time of peace. 
Third, applied research and development requires a 
great amount of time and money. Therefore, it became ob¬ 
vious that the establishment of a long-range national re¬ 
search program must be integrated with the program of pro¬ 
duction. This requires a special working relationship 
among the government, the military, scientists, and indus¬ 
try. 
Unlike the attitude of the government after World War 
I, the government now supported the development of the aero¬ 
space industry in every possible way after World War II. 
The aggravation of the Cold War further enhanced its support 
of the industry. The government-industry relationship be¬ 
came more of a partnership than a customer-producer relation¬ 
ship. Thus the military-industrial complex began to take 
shape.^ 
The launching of the U.S.-Soviet space race in the 
1950's and the increasing military reliance upon missiles 
shifted the structure of the industry. A decisive conse¬ 
quence of the space race was a decrease in demand for mili- 
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tary planes. There was some compensating increase in the 
output of civil aircraft and there were also exciting pros¬ 
pects in some other areas such as Vertical-Take-Off-and-Land- 
ing aircraft(VTOL), Short-Take-Off-and-Landing aircraft(STOL) 
and urban transportation. Nonetheless, military aircraft 
had always constituted the largest segment of the industry's 
business. Thus when this dropped off, the industry had to 
find an alternative. Of the many alternatives, going into 
missile production itself was the most feasible one. How¬ 
ever, there is no compelling reason for missiles to be made 
by the aircraft industry. In some case electronic firms 
were more qualified to do so. Nevertheless, the aircraft 
industry, by adapting a new requirement of technology and 
the course of public policy, was successful in transforming 
itself into the aerospace industry. 
The introduction of the jet engine also altered the 
market structure of the industry. Boeing's successful mo¬ 
dification of the jet tanker, KC-135, into a commercial 
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transport put it in a formidable position. The jet 
transport also had a profound impact on the laymen's concept 
of the world as well as on Wall Street by adding dozens of 
new glamour stocks in the airline business. In 1968, the 
industry reached a record prosperity due to the Vietnem War, 
the ambitious space project, and the ever expanding commer¬ 
cial transport demand. But the end of the Vietnam War and 
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the reduction of the space program coupled with soft demand 
in commercial transport and high inflation ignited by the 
oil crisis hit the industry hard. 
The aerospace industry adapted itself to a new situ¬ 
ation by expanding its export sector. By definition, trade 
deficit on one side means trade surplus on the other side. 
Thus the oil crisis in the rest of world implies a record 
surplus in the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries 
(OPEC) members. Aerospace products were precisely what 
OPEC wanted most. OPEC, with virtually unlimited financial 
resources, soon became the best customers of the U.S. aero¬ 
space industry. In 1975, the aerospace exports reached a 
new high of $7.8 billion with over $7 billion of net trade 
balance. This represents 73.4 percent of the net trade 
balance of this country.^ But at this point another fac¬ 
tor that clouds the future of the industry must be consider¬ 
ed: the conflict of U.S. military and foreign policies with 
foreign trade. 
Behind the record of upsurge and downswing was the 
industry’s unique monopsonistic character; the U.S. govern¬ 
ment purchased over 60 percent of the total output. This 
industry heavily depends on the military procurement, sub¬ 
ject to public policy. Yet history reveals that the U.S. 
had no consistent plan in peace time to maintain production 
levels, except years ago when the Morrow Board program(1926- 
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1931) was in effect.^ On top of this, the unique nature 
of the industry as the producer of the most advanced weapon 
systems makes it subject to a close regulation by public 
policy in its foreign trade activities. 
The federal government's contribution to the progress 
of the industry is substantial. Research work with public 
funding was vitally important in the advancement of aero¬ 
nautical science and technology. Besides military procure¬ 
ment, the expenditure of public funds for airports, air 
traffic control and navigational aides, and the promotion 
of safety, economically stimulated the expansion of avia¬ 
tion and therefore of the industry. Hence public policy 
in both the military and foreign areas and entrepreneurs 
adapting themselves to these policies control the general 
pattern of progress in both domestic and foreign trade. 
Comparative advantage in foreign trade may have resulted 
from these activities, but not vice versa. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW CF LITERATURE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
International trade theory rests on attempts to explain 
the causes and determinants of the natterns of international 
-w 
trade by comparative advantage. But is comparative advan¬ 
tage really a cause or simply a result of international 
trade? Although many theorists seem to take causality 
for granted, the importance of considering the matter can 
hardly be exaggerated since the future pattern of trade and 
the developmental strategy of an economy will depend upon it 
For instance if comparative advantage theor37 were cor¬ 
rect, the prewar U.S. would have been better off by remain¬ 
ing a predominantly agricultural economy indefinitely while 
Britain concentrated on technology intensive industry such 
as the aircraft industry. Indeed this was the case until 
World War II. When the war broke out, the U.S. had to pro¬ 
duce British models to equip its own Air Force. Numerous 
patents and research data liberally sunnlied by Britain 
were indispensable for the U.S. in catching ud with the Euro 
pean aircraft industry. The only major advantage the U.S. 
aircraft industry had was that it was located far away from 
the bombing range of the Luftwaffe. Equally important was 
the fact that the U.S. government was willing to and was 
able to, generate on unprecedented mass demand of aircrafts 
in order to win the war. 
By the end of the World War II, the U.S. aircraft in¬ 
dustry emerged as the largest manufacturing industry of the 
world. Yet, it was still lacking in quality, and was not 
superior to the British aircraft industry. The first com¬ 
mercial jet transport, Comet was developed by the British, 
and Vickers and Arristrong were still dominating the postwar 
world market. The British aircraft industry was about four 
years ahead of the U.S. in technology^ and many 3ritish 
models such as the Canberra were adapted as production 
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models even after the war. 
The U.S. aircraft industry, however, had strong govern¬ 
ment support through a generous procurement policy which 
was further expanded as the Cold War became intensified. 
The technological base which was gained from military pro¬ 
curement was automatically transferred into the development 
of commercial aviation. This was culminated in Boeing's 
successful modification of the jet tanker, KC 135, into 
model 707. Eventually, the British aircraft industry was 
forced to retreat from long range jet transport. It was 
to the advantage of the U.S. aerospace industry that it 
started late, for it was able to learn from the mistakes 
which the British manufacturer had made. 
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Gradually, the U.S. aerospace industry replaced the 
British manufacturers in the world market. The compara¬ 
tive advantage theory suggests that a country should rein¬ 
force the present patterns of foreign trade in order to be¬ 
nefit most from trade. In reality, however, comparative 
advantage is a result rather than cause of trade. It is 
also local because the cost curve of any particular firm 
may not be identical to the cost curve of an industry. 
Thus it could be true that the most efficient firm in the 
least efficient economy is more efficient than the most 
efficient firm of the most efficient economy. Consequently, 
a firm's position in international market is not necessarily 
determined by the market position of the industry as a whole. 
Comparative advantage is then not a national economic pheno¬ 
menon but a local phenomenon. 
Other positive external factors such as government pro¬ 
curement policy and tax incentive more often than not affect 
the conditions of production and demand. New patterns of 
foreign trade emerge as the result of these. Therefore, 
instead of a comparative advantage theory we propose a dy¬ 
namic externality theory. Even if the comparative advan¬ 
tage theory may be useful in defending the vested interest 
of the British aircraft industry, it is not useful in ex¬ 
plaining the behavior of a country which strives for catch¬ 
ing up with others as was the case of the U.S. in the 1940's. 
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This dynamic externality theory may not apply to every 
industry or every country but it certainly helps us under¬ 
stand the development strategy of the developing countries. 
The development of high technology - high unit value indus¬ 
try is crucial to any economy for improving the living stand¬ 
ard of its people. The traditional comparative advantage 
theory directs us to obey the present pattern of foreign 
trade, thus further reinforcing the state of comparative 
advantage, and widening the income gap among countries. 
The dynamic externality theory, however, indicates that com¬ 
parative advantage can be changed by public policy. 
This purports to investigate the economic impact of 
public policy upon the growth of a technology industry, the 
U.S. aerospace industry in light of international trade 
theory. For this purpose, the major theories of interna¬ 
tional trade will be critically reviewed. Then the growth 
of the U.S. aerospace industry and the changing patterns of 
foreign trade will be analyzed with respect to the U.S. pub¬ 
lic policies. 
Even if every exporting country has a comparative ad¬ 
vantage over every importing countries for a specific pro¬ 
duct, it does not necessarily mean that comparative advan¬ 
tage caused the country to export that specific product. 
It may well be the other way around, or that a third factor 
which caused comparative advantage may have also caused ex- 
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port. For instance, since sun rays cause warm weather and 
dark shadow, there is a positive correlation between temper¬ 
ature and the intensity of the darkness of shadow. But 
this does not mean that higher temperature causes darker 
shadows or vice versa. In order to scrutinize this matter, 
we need further intuitive observations of the phenomena. 
From Ricardo onward, most of the international trade 
theorists have focused on the production and cost aspects 
of international trade. This culminated in the Heckscher- 
4 5 
Ohlin theory which is effectively challenged by Leontief. 
Since then many critiques and defenses have been exchanged 
by the opponents and proponents of this theory. Meanwhile, 
many theorists have attempted to improve the traditional 
model by expanding it in both space and time dimensions. 
Yet all the attempts have been greatly hindered by poorly 
defined variables and many unrealistic key assumptions. 
In order to improve this theory, therefore, we need to ex¬ 
amine the relevance of the assumptions since the ultimate 
value of a theory rests on its external relevance as well 
as internal consistency. At the same time, we need to 
clarify precisely definitions of the variables. 
Unfortunately, one of the most important aspects of in¬ 
ternational trade, the income effect and other external fac¬ 
tors have been largely neglected by the traditional theor¬ 
ists. The income effect is the effect of trade on the in- 
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come expansion and accompanying multiplier-accelerator ef¬ 
fect, as well as the distribution of income. In a sense, 
the income effect of international trade is even more cru¬ 
cial than the specialization of production due to price ef¬ 
fect, because of its dynamic nature. Thus the author ca- 
tagorized all the previous significant studies under three 
headings: Protectionism, price theory, and income theory. 
Some may think that this is a rather unusual classification 
However, there is nothing sacrosanct about any classifica¬ 
tion. 
Protectionism has never been acknowledged as a rigor¬ 
ous school. Yet it has such an amazing staying power that 
even today imposes a meaningful threat to the enhancement 
of international welfare. Also its argument has been con¬ 
stantly sharpened by an unceasing stream of patronized scho 
lars. Even as this is being written President Carter i3 
being pressed by the steel and shoe industries and labor, 
to cite a few, to restrict foreign imports. Thus even 
though many theorists fend protectionism to be an unfounded 
theory, it is important to examine it critically. 
The first true scientific approach to international 
trade is price theory. This can be traced back to Adam 
Smith's absolute advantage theory. This has evolved to 
Ricardo’s well known comparative advantage theory, which 
was actually first conceived by R. Torrens.^ This i3 fur- 
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ther developed by Eeckscher, Oh I in, end SanteIson, but it 
has still regained a price theory. Its inability to ex¬ 
plain the international economic phenomena has led to con¬ 
siderable criticise:. Idost of the criticises, however, are 
1ini ted in their scope to the price and production sides of 
international trade. Thus sore people like, Wijnhclds" 
lanented to the fact that ’too such tine has been already 
wasted in patching up a theory which is faulty in its very 
f our cation. ” 
-T.e cntica- orttt orouer.t mere as m2 u" tore attentat 
to the incone aspect of international trade. Yet nest of 
conterporary economists , who were brought up in an affluerr 
society, tend to take for granted this real driving force 
:ema* ■"'ace, water, nace tee present art usance 
tossit _e nevertheless, nany, consciously and unconscious¬ 
ly, wrote about incone effect and its duplication to the 
national econonv. 
Although incone theory explains the current internation¬ 
al trade pattern better than price theory it still lacks an 
explanation of the active cause of it. -nis is cue tc the 
fact that it deals with the s :s rather than tne setts. 
cause. A disease is not caused by high terperature but by 
a pathogenic agent. A high terperature is only one or tne 
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would not always diagnosis correctly. 
In the same fashion, we should look into any economic 
phonemena in light of active causes rather than passive sym¬ 
ptoms. In the real world, the true actor is Man. Conse¬ 
quently, his value system, mentality, physical dimension, 
and social institution direct the destiny of the world he 
lives in. In the real world these could converge into pub¬ 
lic policies ranging from military policy to tax structure. 
This study attempts to find the true driving force of inter¬ 
national trade in actors rather than in symptoms. There¬ 
fore, it seems more appropriate to look into public policy 
which is the social embodiment of Man himself. 
2. OVERVIEW 
Most of the significant studies can be systematized in 
the following format: 
Table 1. Theories of International Trade 
Major Theories Major Arthors 
Jean Bodin (1530-96) 
Protection- 
Mercantilism 
Jean Colbert (1619-83) 
Thomas Mun (1571-1641) 




Labor Unions all over the 
world 
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Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804) 
Frdrick List (1789-1804) 
3. Hildebrand (1812-1878) 
W. Roscher (1817-1894) 
K. Knies (1821-1898) 
Absolute Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
Advantage J.S. Mill (1806-1973) 
R. Torrens (1780-1864) 
Comparative 
Advantage 
David Ricardo (1772-1333) 
David Hume (1711-1776) 
Francis Edgeworth (1845-1926) 
Price Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) 
Theory 
Factor- 
En do wizen ts 
Eli Heckscher (1879-1952) 
Bertil Ohlin (1932) 
Paul Samuelson (1941) 
James Meade (1950) 
Wassily Leontief (1953) 




G.N. T. Hung (1968) 
Revised Transpcr- M. Beckman '1955' 
Price ration Is are 6c Peck (1954) 




i . w . Travis ^1956) 
D. Reesing (1968) 
Gruber '156”) 
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Major Theories Major Arthors 
Colin Clark (1938) 
Roy Harrod (1939) 
D.H. Robertson (1939) 
Multiplier L.A. Metzler (1942) 
Accelerator Fritz Machlup (1943) 
Theory Joan Robinson (1947) 
Income 
(Real Side) J.J. Polak (1947) 
W. Stolper (1947) 
Kenichi Miyazawa (1960) 
Douglas North (1961) 
C.P. Kindleberger (1961) 
R.D. Wolff (1970) 
Theory 
J.M. Keynes (1929) 
August Losch (1930) 
Balance of Fritz Machlup (1930) 
Trade Theory Arnold Harberler (1950) 
(Monetary S.S. Alexander (1952) 
Side) H.G. Johnson (1956) 
Jan Tinbergen (1952) 
Paul Ellsworth (1950) 
A.J. Brown (1951) 
Gottfried Kaberler (1949) 
Terms of 
R.E. Baldwin (1955) 
Trade 
W.M. Corden (1957) 
Paul Prebisch (1963) 
Murray Demp (1956) 
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3. PROTECTIONISM 
The progenitor of protectionism is mercantilism, which 
is the label given to the doctrines of nationstate in the 
period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. 
This emphasizes the importance of the trade surplus in se¬ 
curing precious metals, which are regarded as essential to 
national wealth and strength. 
The essentials of this doctrine can be summarized in 
the following manner. 
1. a trade policy should be framed and executed in 
nationalistic scope; 
2. the assessment of a policy was based on the net 
inflow of precious metals; 
3. policy goal was to secure the largest possible 
trade surplus so that the quantity of precious 
metals can be increased; 
4. high tariffs and all the possible means to control 
imports as well as direct promotion of exports by 
government authorities were used in order to at¬ 
tain trade surplus; 
5. since all countries cannot attain trade surplus 
simultaneously, hostility amongst nations is in¬ 
evitable . 
* later mercantilists (e.g. Steuart) have the coloration of 
classicists. 
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According to mercantilism, imports are a necessary evil 
and ought to be carried out only if they are: 
1. essentials which cannot be produced domestically; 
2. raw materials with high labor contents for eventual 
re-exports; 
3. compensation for other country's imports from the 
concerned country. 
Thus the implicit mercantilist ideal is zero import. 
Even in France where mercantilism was most prominent 
during the fifteenth to eighteenth century, many worried 
that the severity of French import restrictions would re¬ 
sult in other countries's retaliation. But Colbert per¬ 
sisted that only France alone, with her large population 
and domestic market, can produce the whole range of commodi¬ 
ties , whereas no others could dispense with French commodi¬ 
ties . Thus France should not worry about others' reaction 
to her protectionism. 
o 
Thomas Mun advocated that gold export to buy goods 
which is to be re-exported later is desirable and necessary 
for the national interest in the long run. Also David 
q 
Hume pointed out that a trade surplus leads to an expansion 
of money supply and to an inflation which ultimately hampers 
exports and thus eliminates the trade surplus. The fever 
of protectionism subsided as more rational classical school 
gained momentum. Whenever domestic economy gets in trouble, 
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however, the ghost of mercantilism haunts only to further 
aggravate the depression.^ 
Much of the neo-mercantilism (protectionism) argued 
by the labor unions all around the world is based on the 
protection of transitional unemployment which is necessary 
for any adjustment toward optimum allocation. But their 
goal is entrenched with self-defeating elements as well as 
being detrimental to the public interest in both the short 
run and the long run. 
For instance, if the U.S. raises the current tariff 
rate of 10 per cent of shoes to 40 per cent as the Inter¬ 
national Trade Commission(ITC) recommended, 5,100 jobs will 
be saved on the assumption that labor union's claim is cor¬ 
rect. ^ The ITC proposal would, however, add another $1 
to the retail price of casual shoes made abroad resulting 
in a $500 million extra burden to the American consumers a 
year. This means each shoe worker is subsidized with 
about $100,000 not considering the loss of reciprocal for¬ 
eign demand which can only be financed by corresponding ex¬ 
ports . Furthermore, this kind of misallocation of resour¬ 
ces tends to decrease the efficiency of efficient sectors 
thus making them less competitive. Therefore, sound value 
system of economics based on rational assessment of the re¬ 
ality should be mobilized once again for the public interest. 
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4. PRICE THEORY 
A. ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE THEORY 
This division of labor, according to Adam Smith‘d, can 
benefit all the concerned parties on an international scale 
as well as on a national scale. To be benefited by abso¬ 
lute advantage, every country should concentrate on what it 
can produce more economically than others and trade for the 
goods which others produce at less cost. Thus, interna¬ 
tional trade enhances the utilization of unused factors of 
production. John Stuart Mill ^ later called this "Vent of 
Surplus" theory of international trade. 
B. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE THEORY 
David Ricardo‘S went one step further by stating that 
it is not the absolute, but the comparative advantages which 
cause and determine the patterns of international trade. 
Even if a country were absolutely advantageous or disadvan¬ 
tageous in producing everything, it would still be benefited 
to concentrate on the production of the goods which are com¬ 
paratively advantageous. 
His implicit assumptions are followed: 
1. no economies of scale and no technological change; 
2. fixed factor supply and full employment; 
3. no transportation cost and free trade; 
the costs are determined by the amount of labor 4. 
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put into the product; 
5. perfect mobility of production factors domestically 
and perfect immobility internationally. 
Then he goes on to the familiar example of England and Por¬ 
tugal . 
Table 2. Unit Cost of Production Before Trade 
(Men a year) 
Products England Portugal 
Wine (a gallon) 120 80 
Cloth (a yard) 100 90 
Source: The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Lon¬ 
don"! Sraff (ed.), 1952, Vol. 1, pp. 135-136. 
In England a gallon of wine costs 120 men for one year 
and a yard of cloth 100, while in Portugal the real cost of 
wine and cloth amounts to 80 and 90 men for a year respec¬ 
tively. Portugal thus has an absolute advantage over Eng¬ 
land in the production of either commodity, but a compara¬ 
tively greater advantage in the production of wine since 
80/120 is smaller than 90/100. The pre-trade price ratio 
of wine and cloth would be proportional to their costs of 
production, that is, 120 : 100 in England and 80 : 90 in 
Portugal. Thus cloth is comparatively cheap in England 
and wine is comparatively cheap in Portugal. 
After trade is opened between the two countries, England 
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will export cloth and import wine. Ignoring transport 
costs, an equilibrium price will result which will lie be¬ 
tween the limits of 120 : 100. If England now specializes 
in the porduction of cloth and transfers labor from agricul¬ 
ture into industry, it can produce 1.2 units of cloth for 
each unit of wine, which it no longer produces. These 
units of cloth now can be exchanged for 1.2 units of im¬ 
ported wine from Portugal. Through trade, England will 
gain extra 0.2 units of wine for each unit of cloth export¬ 
ed. Thus the same quantity of goods produced could now be 
procured at lower real cost. 
Accordingly, despite that Portugal produces both wine 
and cloth more efficiently, she would benefit by concentrat¬ 
ing on wine production and importing cloth from England. 
For England, even though she produces less efficiently than 
Portugal in both wine and cloth, she can still benefit by 
concentrating on cloth production and trading with Portugal. 
This economic justification of free trade is probably the 
most significant contribution of the classical school. 
On the basis of prewar statistics on labor proaucti- 
16 
vity in the the U.S. and Britain, McDougall* attempted to 
assess the theory. He examined the productivity in twenty- 
five industries and their exports to the third countries. 
His finding upheld the theory of comparative advantage with 
regard to the U.S. and 3ritish trade with others. 
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Bhagwati,^ however, refutes the argument on the basis 
that correlation coefficients are insignificant and labor 
productivity is not datum in the sense that production 
functions are. Further weakness is that data on labor 
productivity are unaccompanied by any explanation of why 
the labor productivity is what it is and how it may be ex¬ 
pected to change. Moreover, even if we could predict 
changes in labor productivity, we could not tell that the 
pattern of trade would change in a specified manner. 
In the two-commodity case, constant comparative costs 
merely set the limits between which the ratio of interna¬ 
tional trade will fall. Their exact location will be de¬ 
termined by the interplay of the forces of demand and supply. 
This is known as the theory of international value, which 
was conceived by John Stuart Mill. Mill developed the 
theory of the import demand of country in terms of its own 
exports. In this context, he employed the concept of de¬ 
mand elasticity which has become widely used by many contem¬ 
porary theorists. He also considered the concept of mul¬ 
tiple equilibria, as well as economic consequences of tar¬ 
iff under different elasticities of demand. 
Marshall further developed the theory of international 
value by introducing the concept of reciprocal demand and 
supply curves. "Reciprocal" here means that the demand 
curve of country A for the products of country B is simul- 
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taneously A's supply curve of its own exports. By this he 
attempts to derive a general equilibrium in international 
trade. Each point along such a curve is in effect a possi¬ 
ble point of equilibrium and each movement along the curve 
presupposes that the economy of the concerned country has 
adapted itself to the new equilibrium situation. 
The classical theory of comparative cost, nevertheless, 
contains a considerable amount of vulnerability. First, 
although some degree of arbitrary assumptions are generally 
accepted practice of model building, (inherent nature of 
theory construction) there are too many unrealistic funda- 
mantal assumptions. For instance, transportation costs 
seriously impinge upon comparative advantage. Also, once 
the two-factor, two-country, and two-commodity assumptions 
are relaxed, the patterns of trade based on the comparative 
advantage can no longer hold. Second, labor costs are not 
identical throughout a country and are even more so inter¬ 
nationally. Labor is not homogeneous and indeed this is 
one of the causes of international trade occurring. Third, 
this does not tell us about the exchange ratio itself or 
about the actual quantities traded, because it ignores the 
demand side of international trade. Finally, no allowance 
is made for income change or technology and resources, thus 
the analysis is of static nature. 
Despite many deficiencies, the doctrine of comparative 
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advantage has enjoyed unparalleled longevity compared with 
other economic theories. We are not sure whether this is 
a favorable or unfavorable symptom for the advancement of 
the science. Probably one of the reasons why there are 
few controversies is that variables are unrealistic and un- 
quantifiable, thus untestable. Yet it has such strong in¬ 
tuitive appeal that it is rather difficult to refute. 
C. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN THEORY 
The classical theory of international trade was suc¬ 
cessful in explaining differences in the relative share of 
different countries in terms of the different productivity 
of labor in the relevant industries. But the existence of 
the differences in comparative costs was left unexplained. 
Heckscher first attempted to explain this by the different 
factor endowments of the different countries. The theory 
was significantly elaborated by Ohlin, but owes a great 
deal to Samuelson for its analytical techniques and propo¬ 
sitions . 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory adapts most of the assumptions 
employed by comparative advantage theory except the follow¬ 
ing: 
1. it deals with production in terms of money cost 
instead of real cost. Thus it is no longer binded 
by the labor theory of value; 
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2. two factors of production instead of one are used; 
3. for a given commodity, the same production func¬ 
tion, homogeneous in the first degree, is used in 
all countries. Thus, a given change in all inputs 
results in an equal change in output; 
4. the production function is governed by the law of 
constant returns to scale; 
5. the number of factors is not greater than the num¬ 
ber of commodities; 
6. pure competition rules throughout. 
Under these assumptions, international trade will occur 
as long as there are differences in the relative price ratios 
of domestic goods among the countries. Suppose countries A 
and B endowed with fixed quantities of two factors of pro¬ 
duction, labor(L) and capital(K) produce commodities X and 
Y. Assume that A is relatively labor abundant B is capi¬ 
tal abundant on the basis of the physical definition of 
factor abundance. Finally assume that commodity X is labor 
intensive relative to Y for all factor-price ratios. 
If the two countries produced the two commodities in 
the same proportion, the following equation held: 
Q in A 0 in B 2x_ = jx_ , 
Q in A Q in B 
T 7 
where Q is output. Because of different factor endowments, 
commodity X would be relatively cheaper in A than in B: 
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Px in A < 
P in A 
y 
P in B 
x 
P in B 
y 
where P is price. 
Alternatively, at the same relative commodity prices, A 
would be producing relatively more X than Y compared with 
B. Thus following inequality would hold: 
in A in B 
Qy in A Qy in B 
Given any factor price ratio (i.e., w/r), therefore, 
the optimum coefficients of production can be determined. 
This can be done by determining the points on the unit iso¬ 
quants of X and Y where the absolute value of the slope of 
each isoquant is equal to the given ratio w/r. The co¬ 
ordinates of these points are the optimum coefficients of 
production. Assume that these coefficients are a^x, a^ , 
a^x, and a^ , where the first subscript indicates the fac¬ 
tor and the second the commodity. These coefficients are 
common to both countries because of the assumption of iden¬ 
tical production function. 
Since it has been assumed that X is labor intensive 
relative to Y, the following inequality must also be satis¬ 
fied : 
fix v fry 
akx ^y 
The commodity-price ratio is given by 
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_ Wr) (alx + akx) 
Py (w/r)(aly + aky> ' 
Finally, for full employment it is required that the follow¬ 
ing two equations be satisfied: 
alx X + aly y = L’ 
akxX+akyy " K 
where L and K indicate overall factor endowments. Solving 
the above equations for X and Y, we get 
X = i (L aky - K aly), 
Y=i(Kaix- Lakx), 
where A = a-, a, -a.-, a, 
lx ky ly ky. 





* aly = (L/K) aky lv 
K a 
lx - La kx ‘lx - (L/K) akx 
This can be simplified to 
X. R - R 
- = C -£ > 0, 
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akx 
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The right-hand side of the above equation is necessarily 
positive because R is a weight average of Rx and R . 
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Accordingly, R must necessarily lie between and R a 
fundamental property of weighted averages. Hence both the 
numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of the 
above equation are positive. 
Differentiating the ratio X/Y with respect to R, we get 
d (X/Y) R - R 
_ — r £ y 
dR (Rx - R)2 . 
The sign of this derivative coincides with the sign of the 
difference Rx - R^. Since, by assumption, 0/R^.^R^, the 
derivative of X/Y with respect to R must be positive. 
This means that the higher the value of R, the higher the 
value of the ratio X/Y. Since R is assumed to be higher 
in A than in B, at the same relative factor and commodity 
prices, A is producing more X per unit of Y than B. This 
process continues until the price ratio is equalized in 
both countries. 
The theory has an intuitive appeal, but it calls for 
some qualifications. First, the factors of production are 
not homogeneous. The quality of labor as well as the na¬ 
ture of capital structure are significantly different inter¬ 
firm and internationally. Also capital goods may not be 
substitutable to labor and vice versa. The production of 
manufactured goods, owing to reduced transportation costs, 
is no longer so confined by factor endowment as it used to 
be. For example, Japan, with small deposits of iron ore, 
43 
produces more steel than any other country. Manufactured 
commodities constitute more than seventy per cent of the 
total international trade so that the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory does not explain all international trade. 
Second, as in the case of classical theory, the Heck¬ 
scher-Ohlin theory commits the serious fallacy of composi¬ 
tion. This is probably due to the social scientists' gen¬ 
eral affinity to the natural science's neat theoretical 
framework and its precise prescription. The comparative 
advantage theory is built on the assumptions which are un¬ 
realistic and yet so fundamental to the argument. For in¬ 
stance, it is built on two-factor, two-commodity, and two- 
country assumptions. Then with little modification, it is 
extended to a general model. But three is not just one 
more than two always. Three may be an entirely new entity 
Transitivity needs not apply to social phenomena. There¬ 
fore, social science may not fit to the same methodology as 
that of the natural science. 
Third, production techniques are not the same in all 
areas. Many goods can be produced in different factor-in- 
tensive ways, but at similar costs. Fixed overhead cost 
along with expansion of market will inevitably lead to 
lower marginal cost; economies of scale. There may be dis 
economies of scale on a factory level technologically, but 
not on a company level which is the unit of the decision- 
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making in international trade. The company would invest 
in a second factory if the first ran into increasing costs. 
Relinquishing this assumption will thus, make the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory as useful as salt without savor. 
Finally, although all the theoretical models are based 
on unrealistic assumptions by definition, there is a limit 
in its arbitrariness. Once any assumptions cross this 
limit, the theoretical model can never be mended to have 
even a slightest relevance to real world. In this regard, 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, no matter how logically consistent 
it may be, cannot have external relevance. For instance, 
the inclusion of public policy factor may change all other 
variables not in a matter of degree but of quality. All 
the economic models are based on the assumption that Man 
behaves rationally in economic sense (i.e. profit maximi¬ 
zation) . But economically rational behavior may not ne¬ 
cessarily be politically rational behavior and vice versa. 
Specifically, an economically irrational public policy often 
turns out to be politically or militarily rational one. 
Thus combining these two contradicting factor without pro¬ 
per thought would grossly distort the reality. Accordingly, 
this 3tudy focuses on the fundamental problems raised by 
unrealistic assumptions rather than elaborating the pre¬ 
vious model. 
The Stolper-Samuelson^ theory has stood up a little 
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better, although it too depends on a whole set of unrealis¬ 
tic assumptions. It has always been realized that tariff 
affect the distribution of income. While the country as 
a whole loses from a tariff, particular sectors may gain. 
Stolper and Samuelson showed that it is possible for a sec¬ 
tor to gain absolutely as well as relatively from a tariff, 
independent of the consumption pattern and therefore not 
involving an index-number problem. 
The core of argument is that a tariff will raise the 
real income of a country's scarce factor because: 
1. protection increases the relative price of import¬ 
able goods; 
2. an increase in the relative price of good increases 
the real income of the factor used intensively in 
its production; 
3. the importable good is intensive in the use of the 
factor which is scarce domestically. 
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Metzler pointed out that protection may not increase 
the price of the importable good, since it may improve the 
terms of trade sufficiently to shift the terms of trade in 
favor of exports. The necessary condition is that elas- 
tidity of demand for exports is less than the domestic mar¬ 
ginal propensity to consume for exportable goods. Thus, 
a necessary condition for the perverse Metzler result is 
that the export demand elasticity is less than unity. 
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Several economists have made efforts to explore the im¬ 
plications for the factor-price equalization theorem of the 
existence of more than two countries, goods, and factors. 
They have rightly felt that an answer to this question was 
an indispensable first step in deciding whether the theorem 
might have any empirical significance. 
The effect of multiple countries on the analysis, 
other variables held constant, has been found to pose no 
problem. Both Tinbergen and Meade have argued that adding 
more countries merely adds an equal number of equations and 
unknowns to the equation system. The determinateness of 
the system, and the conclusion that prices of comparable 
factors will be equalized by trade, are not affected. Tin¬ 
bergen, a Nobel laureate along with Ohlin and Meade, points 
out, though, that the assumption that no country will spe¬ 
cialize completely is more and more likely to be violated 
as we go on adding countries with divergent factor endow¬ 
ments, and "the equalisation of factor prices will only 
exist as long as not one of the countries is forced - by 
its data in connection with those of the production func- 
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tions and the price ratio - to specialise.” 
But perhaps Tinbergen's statement needs some qualifi¬ 
cation. Consider a multi-country model in which there 
exists, at the equilibrium position for the system, a sub¬ 
set of countries each of which continues to produce a^._ 
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commodities included in the system. Given all the other 
assumptions attaching to the theorem, factor prices will be 
equalized among this subset of countries. In general, how¬ 
ever, factor prices will not be equalized among specialized 
countries, or between specialized and nonspecialized. 
The more difficult problems involved in extending the 
theorem to cases of different numbers of goods and factors 
have been dealt with by means of complete systems by Tinber- 
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gen and Meade. The most basic conclusion to arise from 
these efforts is that the factor-price equalization theorem 
holds for all cases in which the numbers of factors and 
goods are identical. When they become unequal, however, 
it makes considerable difference for the result whether the 
quantity of factors of the quantity of goods is greater. 
Suppose that in a two-country model, with n goods and m 
factors of production, we take international prices as fixed 
and given by international demand conditions. Then the 
relevant equations reduce to the following for each country: 






) , (i = 1,... ,n) 
w. = p . x. (a. , 
j r i i ll • • aim)7 aij 
( i 1, . . . , n, 
j = 1,... ,m) 
These two sets of equations give, respectively, the 
output of each commodity as a function of the quantities of 
all inputs and the wage of each factor as its (identical) 
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marginal value productivity in each industry. The a..'s 
prices, and p^'s product prices. There are nm + m equa¬ 
tions to determine nm 4- m variables, the w. , and the a. . . 
3 30 
Obviously, they will just suffice for this purpose if n 
23 equals m. If m is greater than n, the theorem will en¬ 
tirely fail to hold. No longer can all of the a^. and 
w. be determined from given international prices and pro- 
duction functions; the condition must be added that the 
quantities of factors available are fully employed. 
This method of rendering such a model determinate is 
quite logical; given all international prices, it is in¬ 
tuitively clear that we can deduce the allocation of pro¬ 
duction and factor employment once we have information on 
the nation's total factor supplies. Specifically, we add 
to the two sets of equations above another set in the form 
requiring that factor markets be cleared. There are m 
equations in this form containing n new unknowns, the 's. 
The (m - n) underdeterminacy is just offset. But different 
quantities of factors in different countries (so long as 
the differences are not governed wholly by a single propor¬ 
tionality factor) will influence the dependent variables 




Where the n;usher of goods exceeds the number of fac¬ 
tors (n} m), the natter gets sore complicated. Tinbergen 
examining the equation system describing such a situation, 
found it to be partly underdetemir.ee and partly overceter 
mined, therefore, in general, indeterminate. Kis conclu¬ 
sion was that specialization would as a rale be necessary, 
and "this no longer warrants the equality of factor 
prices. Meade disagreed with this conclusion, and Tin 
bergen himself participated in the amending process. 
exactly determined 
Meade shewed that a subset of equations in the model 
Tinbergen used is not overdetermined, but rather appears 
That is, it seems as if ail prices 
and factor proportions are determined by supply conditions 
alone. When the system is reformulated, it does indeed 
appear that there is one degree of freedom within the sub¬ 
set. The economic meaning of this, Meade contended, is 
that demand conditions are necessary to specify one rela¬ 
tive price relationship in the model, '"but for the rest 
they determine only the amounts of the various products 
which will be consumed." Assuming throughout that none 
of the three products is produced in only one country, 
Meade holds that the essence of the indeterminacy of the 
svstem is the absolute size of the three industries within 
eacn or the two countries 
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D. CONTEMPORARY PRICE THEORIES 
Actually most of the contemporary price theories are 
partially adjusted versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
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Leontief, on the basis of his input-output table, exa¬ 
mines how much capital and labor are required in order to 
produce one million dollars in the export industries and in 
the import competition industries in the U.S. If the Heck- 
scher-Ohlin theory is correct, the U.S. which is presumably 
more capital abundant than the rest of the world, would 
export capital-intensive goods and import labor-intensive 
goods. Leontief's results are summarized in the follow¬ 
ing table: 
Table 3. Factor Requirements of the U.S. Exports and 
Imports Replacements 
(per million dollars of output of average 1947 composition) 
Factors 1947 1951 
export import export import 
Capital 2,551 3,091 2,257 2,303 
1947 $(1,000) 
Labor 181 170 174 168 
men year 
Source: Leontief, Wassily. "Domestic Production and Foreign 
Trade: the American Capital Position Re-examined." 
Economia Intemazionale, February, 1954. Caves 6c 
Johnson, Readings in International Economics, Home- 
wood, Irwin, 1968, pp. 510-519. 
The above table indicates that capital ratio of imports 
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to exports for 1947 is 1.30 and that for 1951 is 1.11. 
This means that imports are more capital-intensive than the 
goods exported by the U.S. This contradicts the Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory and caused a great deal of concern among eco¬ 
nomists, widely known as the Leontief's paradox. Leontief 
himself conjectured that this may be due to the fact that 
American workers are three times more efficient that of the 
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counterparts in the rest of the world. Thus, if the la¬ 
bor were measured in terms of efficiency units, then the 
U.S. will be more labor abundant than the rest of the world. 
Although Leontief's contention reveals a very inter¬ 
esting point, it is still an open question as to how we can 
prove that the American workers are three times more effi¬ 
cient than the workers in the rest of the world. For ex¬ 
ample, comparing the sales per employee for the 500 largest 
industrials in the U.S. and that of Japan, Japanese workers 
were more productive than the u.S. counterparts. Assets 
per employee are also higher in Japan than the U.S. Find¬ 
ings are summarized in the following table 4. 
Although the number of the corporations is very limit¬ 
ed, their combined sales represent about the half of the 
gross national products of each country. Also double 
counting problems impose some qualifications, but we can 
still safely project that Leontief's conjecture is some¬ 
what insecurely founded. A more important aspect of the 
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Table 4. The 500 Largest Industrials in the U.S. and 
Japan (1975) 
U.S. Japan 
Total Sales ($ billion) 865.2 204.7 
Total Profits ($ billion) 
(after-tax) 
37.8 2.1 
Total Assets ($ billion) 668.5 215.5 
Total Employees (million) 14.4 2.7 
Sales Per Employee 60,035.0 76,893.0 
Assets Per Employee 46,383.0 80,937.0 
Profits Per Employee 2,626.0 774.0 
Source: Compiled from The President Directory, Diamond-Time 
Co. Tokyo, 1977, pp. 24-48; Fortune, May 1976, 
pp. 316-341. 
study, however, is that it rufutes one of the key assump¬ 
tions underlying the Heckscher-Ohlin theory: homogeneous 
labor. 
Following the Leontief’s paradox, many economists have 
attempted to rectify the theory from various perspectives. 
One of them is Linder who states that the basis of exports 
is the satisfaction of domestic needs; goods are produced 
for the domestic market first and only after that for the 
foreign market. Since domestic demand is determined by 
income, exports normally go to countries with a comparable 
standard of living. This is contrary to the countries with 
different factor endowments. 
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Kravis suggests that in the U.S. government tends to 
shut out imports that could be produced domestically al¬ 
though at much higher cost. His contention is that the de¬ 
terminants of the pattern of trade is availability or supply 
elasticities. "In short, it is the elasticity of supply 
abroad and its elasticity at home that give rise to this 
import trade, not the relative capital or labor require- 
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ments of the products." 
Availability depends partially upon factor endowments, 
although technological progress and product differentiation 
shape the pattern of trade. By treating natural resources 
factor of production as the principal determinant of trade 
Linder has narrowed down the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, in 
spite of the fact that this is more realistic than Leon- 
tief's conception. 
Many theorists contend that technological changes ex¬ 
plain the pattern of trade. Once an invention is perfect¬ 
ed, the concerned country has a monopoly power over the 
market. As mass-production process is processed, the buy¬ 
ers become increasingly price-conscious. In this phase 
the production technique may be extended to other countries. 
Imitation by other countries terminates the technological 
lead and, through lower production costs and product differ¬ 
entiation, they even export to the country where the inven¬ 
tion is originated. We have witnessed this kind of pro- 
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duct cycle happening in the electronic, computer, and copy¬ 
ing machine industries as well as in automobile industry. 
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Along this line of thought, Hoffmeyer states that 
the U.S. exports of research-intensive goods increased much 
faster than its exports of other goods. The respective 
ratios are 20 : 3 for the period between 1910-14 and 1953- 
59 and 5 : 1.7 for the period between 1926-30 and 1953-59. 
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Hafbarer thinks that the technological lag, along with 
the economies of scale, caused the pattern of international 
trade in synthetic chemical industry. Keesing^ also be¬ 
lieves that there is a strong correlation between research 
and development intensity in the U.S. industries and their 
export performance. 
5. INCOME THEORY 
A theory no matter how ill-conceived it is, tends not 
to be destroyed by intermittent criticisms, but is usually 
replaced by a better theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
is no exception. This theory may explain nineteenth cen¬ 
tury international trade in which primary commodities play¬ 
ed a predominant role. But things have changed as a re¬ 
sult of the reduced transportation costs and constantly 
changing structure of trade resulting from industrializa¬ 
tion. Accordingly, factor endowments have become less 
significant than they were in the last century. 
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Many other forces affect price differences - demand 
conditions, economies of scale, technology, and differing 
production functions. Indeed we are living in a world of 
substantially arbitrary and inflexible price structures, of 
planned economies at the various levels, and of omnipotent 
labor unions. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory is by no means 
relevant for such a world. 
Furthermore, even if relevancy if improved, Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory would still suffer from its neglect of the de¬ 
mand and income aspects of international trade. Production 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for internation¬ 
al trade to occur, because effective demand, not factor en¬ 
dowment, is the generator of actual international trade. 
Failure to see this is precisely what plagued neoclassical 
economists in explaining the chronic depression in 1920's. 
Although Galbraith among a few others, emphasizes the large 
corporation's ability to generate the demand for its own 
products through product differentiation, demand creation 
still remains a limited phenomenon of oligapolistic mar- 
35 
kets. The essence of business, as Henry Kaiser once 
said, is basically finding the demand and filling it. 
Failing to do so would only result in bankruptcy. In the 
long run, therefore, demand dictates supply rather than the 
other way around, because production cannot be sustained 
indefinitely at the absence of an actual effective demand. 
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The income effect is dynamic in contrast to the static 
nature of the price theory. Income generated by exports 
is further expanded through the multiplier-accelerator ef¬ 
fects. New demand in both consumption and investment sec¬ 
tors created by larger income, which is in return generated 
by exports, activates the potential imports of an economy. 
When there are more than two hundred economies instead of 
two, these multiplier-accelerator effects can be amplified 
in much larger magnitude, as long as the concerned countries 
are not over-anxious to attain the instant balance of bila¬ 
teral trade. 
Moreover, even if there is no comparative advantage 
between two countries, international trade will still gen¬ 
erate higher income and more employment via this multiplier- 
accelerator effects than if there were no trade. For ex¬ 
ample, there is no comparative advantage whatsoever between 
country A and B, yet an ambitious entrepreneur of industry 
X in country Y perceived potential opportunity in sales ex¬ 
pansion through exports. As a consequence of export, in¬ 
come of the country A will be expanded and also factors of 
production will be reallocated in favor of industry X. 
This successful sector in the economy bids up the factor 
prices so that the other passive industry will be declining. 
This gives country B, which is strained for foreign exchange, 
a better chance to export Y to country A. Therefore, com- 
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parative advantage emerges as a result of international 
trade, rather than as a cause of it. 
The implication of this argument is that there is no 
such a thing as rigid, inherent comparative advantage or 
disadvantage in the pattern of international trade. Thus 
economic development policy through export expansion should 
not be shackled by any presupposed, fixed comparative cost 
theory. Comparative advantage is a rather flexible and 
resulting effect of international trade. Consequently, 
a country should pay more attention to the income effect 
of international trade than to price effects which are too 
partial to determine the patterns of trade. 
The multiplier-accelerator effects, however, can be 
activated only when exports are linked to investment by 
importing producer goods which will further enhance the 
productivity of an economy. Unless these are activated, 
the trade effect on income growth remains minimal. That 
is why mere linkage of exports to economic development fail¬ 
ed to explain the slow growth of the economies which have 
high export growth rates such as in Rwanda, Upper Volta, 
etc. 
On the other hand, all of the developed countries, 
without exception, attained the present income level through 
a rapid export expansion either during the nineteenth or 
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early twentieth century. As Robertson indicated, trade 
was an ’’engine of growth” in the last century. This means 
that trade is not only a means of optimum resource alloca¬ 
tion, but also a vehicle of expanding income. Then what 
caused this disparity? The constant ploughing-back of the 
income generated by exports and resulting multiplier-acce¬ 
lerator effects made the difference. Thus it is not sur¬ 
prising to find that no single developed economy was devel¬ 
oped by direct foreign investment and foreign aid which do 
not accompany this constant ploughing-back of income. 
Also this explains why the countries, whose high export 
growth was attained by foreign direct investment, could not 
sustain high economic growth rate. 
The theories of income effect of international trade 
can be further divided into growth theory, balance of pay¬ 
ment theory, and terms of trade theory. The monetary side 
of international trade is represented by balance of trade 
and the terms of trade theory. The real side of inter¬ 
national trace is viewed by growth theory or multiplier- 
accelerator theory. 
A. GROWTH THEORY (MULTIPLIER-ACCELERATOR THEORY) 
The foreign trade multiplier theory grew out ot the 
Kevnesian svstem but was not developed bv Keynes himself. 
The dynamic version of the foreign trade multiplier is pri- 
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marily the work of Machlup and Metzler. On the other 
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hand, Harrod and Meade developed the static version. 
Static theory describes and compares equilibrium conditions 
at different times. Dynamic theory examines the transi¬ 
tion from one equilibrium to another. 
The assumptions of the Machlup's theory are following: 
1. marginal costs are constant, thus prices remain 
unchanged; 
2. financing of grade deficit is unlimited; 
3. the marginal propensity to import and the mar¬ 
ginal propenisty to consume are constant; 
4. imports during the period t(Mt) depend upon the 
income of the preceeding period (Y : 
In an open economy, import as well as saving is consi¬ 
dered as leakage. Thus,just like investment multiplier 
in a closed economy, trade multiplier becomes 
1 1 
s + m 1 - c 
where s = 1 - c being the marginal propensity to save and 
m the marginal propensity to import. Suppose country A's 
marginal propensity to save is 0.2 in a closed economy then 
multiplier would 5. If the marginal propensity to import 
is .13 in an open economy, then multiplier will be reduced 
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to 3 since a greater portion of investment expenditures 
will leak out of national income system than before. 
If, however, these phenomena are cumulated throughout 
the world, the money leaked abroad will flow back into the 
country in much greater mahnitude. As rule, the actual 
magnitude depends upon foreign propensity to consume and 
marginal propensity to import. The reason is that the 
rest of the world's economy will be stimulated by the in¬ 
crease of A’s demand and will therefore, in return import 
more from country A. Hence the true multiplier will be 
greater than the foreign trade multiplier which ignores 
these indirect effects. This reciprocal demand is pre¬ 
cisely the underlying idea of the Marshall Plan, although 
real intention is more complicated by political considera¬ 
tion. The result was, as we all know, a most striking 
success. This implies some future course of global scale 
mutual prosperity through open economic policy despite 
many hinderances. 
B. BALANCE OF TRADE THEORY 
In general there are three ways to restore the balance 
of trade; 
1. gold transfer; 
2. fluctuating exchange rate; 
3. direct exchange control and regulation of interna¬ 
tional trade. 
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Under the gold standard system, only domestic price and 
wage levels change. Under flexible exchange rate system, 
domestic price and wage levels remain unchanged while ex¬ 
change rate adjusts itself. The relative prices of diffee- 
ent commodities, however, will have to change in the pro¬ 
cess of adjustment, even if the general price level remains 
unchanged. Most of the balance of trade theories, never¬ 
theless, focus on the adjustment mechanism under the flexi¬ 
ble exchange rate system. 
Haberler^ develops an excellent partial-equilibrium 
anlysis. The key concept is the marginal propensity to 
import, AM/AY, which is analogous to the Keynes’ marginal 
propensity to consume. The income elasticity of demand 
for imports (E) will be denoted in the following way: 
ah / ay Am y 
e = -= — » _ 
m/y Ay m 
where M/Y is the average propensity to import. 
Suppose that the marginal propensity to import of the 
country A (MPI^) is 1/3 and that of B (MPI^) is 2/3. If 
deficit arised in A, A will import less by 1/3 of the 
amount of deficit and B more by 2/3 of the amount of trade 
surplus. Thus income effects are just enough to restore 
equilibrium. If MPI^ + MPI^< 1, however, the income ef¬ 
fects are too weak to reestablish equilibrium in the ba¬ 
lance of payments. On the other hand, if MPI^ + MPI^ > 1 
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then income effects are so strong that the deficit will be 
overcompensated eventually. 
Therefore, if the sum of the country's demand for im¬ 
ports and the corresponding foreign demand for its exports 
is greater than unity, then a currency devaluation can im¬ 
prove the balance of payments. If this sum is smaller 
than unity, then devaluation will only worsen the balance 
of payments. 
The contraries are not rare. The reason is that 
there is often great danger that the favorable effects of 
a devaluation of the balance of payments will be jeopar¬ 
dized by incautious wage and monetary policies. Pressure 
in this direction is so strong because, under full employ¬ 
ment, improvement in the balance of payments is necessarily 
accompanied by a painful reduction in consumption and in¬ 
vestment. Under this circumstamce, government tends to 
alleviate recession and the transitional unemployment, by 
means of generous fiscal and monetary policies. 
6. CONCLUSION AND HYPOTHESES 
The development of international trade theories can 
be summed up under the three distinctive lines of thought: 
protectionism, price theory, and income theory. Modern 
protectionism can be subclassified into unemployment ar¬ 
gument of the trade unions of declining industries in the 
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developed countries and infant industries argument of less 
developed countries. 
The first thought on the price theory can be traced 
back to Adam Smith’s absolute advantage. Comparative ad¬ 
vantage expanded its horizon by stating that even if a coun¬ 
try has an absolutely advantageous or disadvantageous in 
producing both goods, international trade can still be be¬ 
neficial to all the trading partners. This became a power¬ 
ful driving force for free trade. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory further elaborated the in¬ 
ternational price theory by explaining the existence of the 
different comparative costs in terms of different factor 
endowments. This, however, has serious drawbacks. It is 
unrealistic and neglects the aspects of income and demand 
of international trade. This calls for more general 
theory based on realistic assumptions. 
The income theory fills this need neatly. First, in¬ 
come effect is dynamic in nature, contrast to the static 
nature of price theory. Second, this does not require com¬ 
parative advantage to be a prelude to international trade. 
Third, income theory explains the real international trade 
phenomena far better than price theory does. Last, income 
theory is less bound by unrealistic assumptions than price 
theory. Therefore, this income theory is qualified to be 
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further developed into a fuller general theory of interna¬ 
tional trade. But it still lacks the quality of applica¬ 
bility, since it left out consumer taste, conditions of 
production, and especially public policy as variables. 
Public policy requires special attention because it 
changes not only the conditions of production, but also 
of consumption and distribution. Indeed, public policy is 
the social embodiment of economic subject, Man himself. 
Therefore, leaving this out makes the whole theoratical 
framework an empty exercise. 
This leads to the hypothese of this study: 
1. Comparative advantage is not a factor which is 
vested and fixed; 
2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly 
changed by the interaction of the public policy 
and the entrepreneurs' adaptability to their chang¬ 
ing economic reality; 
3. Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving 
force of international trade, but a necessary fac¬ 
tor resulting from exogenous efforts; 
4. The active driving force of international trade 
and the determinant of international trade patterns 
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to 
improve the income and employment levels through 
market expansion. 
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This broadens the scope of assumptions because public poli¬ 
cy necessarily implies value judgements of society. 
7. METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
This study is basically exploratory. Accordingly, 
historical method was used to substantiate the hypotheses 
of the study. By examining the growth of the U.S. aero¬ 
space industry and its export pattern during the last seven¬ 
ty years, this study attempted to suggest a new way to ex¬ 
plain the export behavior of an industry. Especially, for 
the purpose of appreciating the causation in international 
trade, an intuitive observation of economic phenomena is 
inevitably necessitated. 
Past research has suggested that exports play a sig¬ 
nificant role in expanding national income via multiplier- 
accelerator effects. However, they offer no explanation 
as to what causes the present patterns of foreign trade, 
and by what mechanism. If we are to address ourselves 
to these questions, we must utilize empirical data. The 
U.S. aerospace industry is an ideal case to use in address¬ 
ing this inquiry. 
As of 1975, its total sales amounted to $28 billion 
and its total employment was 942,000. Of its total sales, 
public expenditures amounted to $14 billion representing 
about one half of the total sales of the industry. Such 
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spending may cause inflationary pressures. However, it 
is the price we pay for national security and therefore is 
a political problem. 
Defense spending, nevertheless, does have some posi¬ 
tive impacts on the expansion of national income via ex¬ 
ports. As of 1975, exports totaled $7.8 billion. Commer¬ 
cial products accounted for most of the exports, totaling 
$5.3 billion and compounded of $2.4 billion in commercial 
transport deliveries and $2.9 billion in other civil pro¬ 
ducts. The exports of military products totaled $2.5 bil¬ 
lion. All together aerospace exports amounted to 7.4 per 
cent of all U.S. exports. However, because aerospace im¬ 
ports are minor, net trade balance of the industry is well 
over $7 billion. This constitutes 73.4 per cent of the 
/ Q 
U.S. trade surplus for the year. Therefore, the aero¬ 
space industry industry was the single most important sec¬ 
tor of the economy in lieu of the balance of payments. 
But the U.S. aerospace industry was not in that unique 
position from the very beginning of its turbulent history. 
Despite the fact that the first successful flight was done 
by Americans, the U.S. aircraft industry itself was well 
behind the British until the 1950's. The reasons are: 
First, the technological level of related industries as 
well as aeronautics itself lagged behind that of the Bri¬ 
tain. Second, military demand which was even more crucial 
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than it is now was particularly soft because the U.S. was 
then under self-imposed neutrality. Third, all the social 
infra structures necessary for the industry development 
such as airports, regulation, and pilots were inadequate. 
Last, demand was cyclical and erratic so that it was diffi¬ 
cult for the industry to maintain a steady team of resear¬ 
chers and developers as well as maintaining production 
level. 
The outbreak of World War II and subsequent changes of 
public policy transform the whole industry drastically. 
Technological gap was narrowed and eventually surpassed 
owing to the unlimited public expenditures on research and 
development. Military demand was sky rocketed with not 
only domestic procurement but also foreign demand from all 
the Allies. Virtually every county comes to have large 
or small airport. An unlimited number of pilots, trained 
by military, came into civilian market and the most rigid 
safety regulation was put into force thus raising the pub¬ 
lic confidence in aviation. This shift of public policy 
was further enhenced by the intensification of the cold 
war and the space race between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. 
As a result of this comparative advantage between the 
U.S. and British aerospace industries was totally reversed. 
So were the patterns of foreign trade regarding aerospace 
products which we would look into more thoroughly in the 
68 
next chapter. In short, comparative advantage is not some 
thing which suddenly appears out of nowhere, but is the cu¬ 
mulative result of tenacious and deliberate public policies 
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CHAPTER III. GROWTH OF THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
1. DAWN OF AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
It all began at Kitty Hawk on the 17th of December, 
1903. The 12 second flight over the distance of 100 feet 
opened a new era of history. The beginning of the aircraft 
industry, however, was not glorious. The Wright brothers 
established the first aircraft company in 1909 but it was 
soon closed. The U.S. aircraft industry lagged behind its 
European counterpart. In 1914, when the Bureau of Census 
recognized the existence of the industry, there were only 
sixteen companies which produced 49 aircrafts during the 
1 
year. 
Initially during World War I airplanes were used as 
scouts observing enemy forces. But it was soon recognized 
that the airplane was also useful as a combat weapon. In 
1915, the Allies placed their first orders to the U.S. to 
ease their own domestic porduction. However, the U.S. air¬ 
craft industry was not ready for the task. A prime bottle¬ 
neck was the tangled patent controversy in the U.S. aircraft 
industry. Consequently, it was difficult to get orders 
filled because some companies would not invest for fear that 
2 
suits brought against them would force them out of business. 
To solve this Droblem the National Advisory Committee 
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for Aeronautics(NACA) proposed to the industry that they 
draw up a patent licensing agreement whereby everybody mak¬ 
ing planes for the government might share the patents. The 
cross-license agreement similar to that under which the auto¬ 
mobile industry had been working for years was to be adminis¬ 
tered by a new organization of the aircraft industry. That 
organization was the Manufacturers Aircraft Association(MAA). 
Any aircraft manufacturer could become a member and have the 
use of all patents under the agreement. The Association was 
to collect a blanket royalty fee of $200 for each plane and 
3 
apportion it among the patent owners as stipulated. 
Yet many problems remained to be solved. There was no 
time to design and test a new aircraft, however, no opera¬ 
tional fighter had been fully developed in the U.S. Only 
the European aircraft industry had accomplished anything in 
that direction. The British De Havillands was adapted by 
the U.S. as a production model. But the Allied Missions 
insisted that the U.S. produce only parts and engines while 
the planes were to be assembled in Europe. In spite of all 0i- 
these difficulties, an ambitious program of producing 20,000 
combat planes and 9,000 trainers was inaugurated. The num- 
4 
ber of employees increased rapidly from 5,000 to 175,000. 
Other industries including, the automobile industry, were 
called upon in the production which had rapidly expanded. 
Congress appropriated $1.6 billion for the Army Air 
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Corps during the twenty-one months of the U.S. participation 
in the war. But nearly half of that amount remained in the 
U.S. Treasury. After the war another large sum was recover¬ 
ed through liquidation and sales of supplies. A consider¬ 
able amount was spent abroad since the U.S. aircraft industry 
was not ready to supply aircraft of the required specifica¬ 
tions. The Army purchased 5,229 airplanes and 7,059 air¬ 
craft engines from European aircraft industry. With spare 
parts and the other supplies total foreign expenditures amoun¬ 
ted to more than $139 million. About $350 million was spent 
on airplanes, engines, and spare parts in the U.S. Approxi¬ 
mately two-thirds of this was for engines. For this, the 
Army received a total of 13,894 airplanes and 41,953 aircraft 
engines, including spare parts for both planes and motors.^ 
U.S. aircraft production up to the Armistice is shown in the 
following table 5. Data are not available prior to 1911. 
It was not until the Armistice was signed that the U.S. 
aircraft industry geared up to full production. However, 
the Armistice threw the industry into a chaos of reorganiza¬ 
tion. The military already had more airplanes than it could 
use. 
The U.S. aircraft industry was left overcapitalized, 
over-manned, and over-stocked. Many firms quickly went out 
of business. Three months after the Armistice the aircrart 
industry was liquidated to ten per cent of its wartime strength. 
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Table 5. U.S. Aircraft Production 
1912 to 1918 
(Number of Aircraft) 
Year Total Military Civil 
1912 45 16 29 
1913 43 14 29 
1914 49 15 34 
1915 178 26 152 
1916 411 142 269 
1917 2,148 2,013 135 
1918 14,020 13,991 29 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬ 
space Facts and Figures, 1963, Washington, P.C., 
pp. 6-7. 
The remaining firms relied on the small military procurement 
at irregular intervals. 
The industry created the Aeronautical Chamber of Commer¬ 
ce in 1922 to promote commercial aviation. Until then the 
industry was caught in a vicious circle. It could not sell 
machines, therefore, it could not finance research and devel¬ 
opment. And until it could produce better aircraft, there 
was little chance of procuring the financial support neces¬ 
sary for commercial aviation. The Chamber appealed to the 
government for help. President Coolidge appointed an Air¬ 
craft Board under the chairmanship of Dwight Morrow.^ This 
Board held hearings and rendered an exhaustive report. As 
a result of this the National Air Law was passed in 1926, 
placing the responsibility for control of commercial aviation 
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in the Department of Commerce. A Five-year procurement pro¬ 
grams were also adopted for the military, providing for an 
increasing number of aircraft each year until 1932. 
Then came the Lindbergh's epic flight from New York to 
Paris in May 1927. Public enthusiasm exploded and aviation 
became popular overnight. This along with other flights 
such as a transcontinental non-stop flight, around-the-world 
flight, and a North Pole flights ensured a formidable posi¬ 
tion for the industry in public opinion. The U.S. aircraft 
industry had finally gained the recognition necessary to 
carry on the progressive development of aviation. From 1927 
to 1929 industry sales were increased from 21 million dollars 
to 71 million dollars.'7 But subsequently industry sales 
dropped to 26 million dollars in 1932. Civil aircraft pro¬ 
duction dropped from 5,516 in 1929 to 803 in 1932. (See 
Table 6) This transition was reflected in the stock price 
of the Wright Company which produced the engine for Lind¬ 
bergh’s Spirit of St. Louis. "A month before the flight it 
was selling at 25, and by December, 1927, it had more than 
tripled in value, going to 94 3/4; in another year it reach¬ 
es 
ed 245.” Subsequently, however, it dropped to 10 3/4 in 
1930.9 
The prime customer of the industry has always been the 
U.S. government. During the five-year program from 1927 to 
1934, it appropriated 436 million dollars. The military 
Table 6. 
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U.S. Aircraft Production 
1919 to 1938 
(Number of Aircraft) 
Year Total Military Civil 
1919 780 682 98 
1920 328 256 72 
1921 437 389 48 
1922 263 226 37 
1923 743 687 56 
1924 377 317 60 
1925 789 447 342 
1926 1,186 532 654 
1927 1,995 621 1,374 
1928 4,346 1,219 3,127 
1929 6,193 677 5,516 
1930 3,437 747 2,690 
1931 • 2,800 812 1,988 
1932 1,396 593 803 
1933 1,324 466 858 
1934 1,615 437 1,178 
1935 1,710 459 1,251 
1936 3,010 1,141 1,869 
1937 3,773 949 2,824 
1938 3,623 1,800 1,823 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬ 
space Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 6. 
demand was confined to ten companies which received roughly 
90 per cent of this business. In other words, the other 
286 companies manufacturing planes had almost no participa¬ 
tion in this stable business.^ Even among the ten largest 
manufacturers, United Aircraft and Transport and Curtiss- 
Wright dominated this government market. One of the reasons 
for this concentration was the complicated method of negotiat¬ 
ing government contracts so that practically all were let 
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on a non-competitive basis. Their relative market share is 
shown in the table 7. 
Table 7. U.S. Aircraft and Engine Sales; 1927 to 1933 
Millions of Dollars.(Percentage in Parenthesis) 
Companies Navy Army Commercial Total 
U A & T 33.2(28) 17.0(29) 28.1(48) 78.0(42) 
Curtiss-Wright 15.7(23) 29.0(50) 26.8(46) 75.6(39) 
Subtotal 48.9(71) 46.0(80) 54.9(94) 149.0(81) 
Total of 
Independents 19.7(29) 11.9(20) 3.6(6) 35.1(19) 
Total 68.6(100) 57.9(100) 58.5(100) 184.9(100) 
Source: Compiled from Delaney Hearings, 73rd Congress, Wash¬ 
ington, D.C., 1934, pp. 502-503. 
Congress began to question the military procurement 
procedure in 1934. Congressman McFarlane stated that "Of 
the 4,245 engines purchased by the Army since the Aircraft 
Act of 1926, 2,492 were purchased from Pratt & Whitney, and 
1,153 from Wright, 587 from Wright Subsidiaries, and only 13 
from all other engine manufacturers together. Since the 
Aircraft Act of 1926 the Navy obtained 2,149 engines from 
Pratt & Whitney, 971 from Wright, 2 from Wright subsidiaries 
and 36 from all others. He also asserted that the manu¬ 
facturers monopolizing military procurements were subsidiar¬ 
ies of the same large groups that monopolized air-mail con¬ 
tracts; and that the large profits made by these subsidiaries 
were not directly subject to taxation, since the parent com- 
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panies filed consolidated income-tax returns. He estimated 
that the government’s loss due to this was over 2 million 
dollars from 1928 to 1932.^ 
In 1933, the Crane Committee reported that interlock¬ 
ing interests and directorates had prevented the development 
of aviation, and had resulted in the waste of public funds. 
This Report recommended that operating and manufacturing 
13 
companies be separated. After the great upheaval the in¬ 
dustry was separated into two parts: transport and manufac¬ 
turing. Then the Watres Act of 1934 was passed. The Act 
prohibited interlocking directorates, overlapping interests, 
certain consolidations or mergers, and mutual stockholdings 
in order to break the monopoly of the large groups. These 
provisions were reaffirmed in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938.14 
But as the international political atmosphere grew tense 
the aircraft industry was again in the limelight. It had 
become the most crucial means of national securit}/ to be cul¬ 
tivated and nurtured. This drastic shift in its role is 
also a reflection of the change in the conception of modern 
warfare in the military sector. The change in sentiment 
from neutrality to defense-at-all-costs was a major factor 
in the expanding defense budget. Industry sales shot up 
from $44 million in 1934 to more than $600 million in 1939. 
Meanwhile, Congress was shocked at the participation Oj. 
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the aircraft industry in the international arms trade. Pub¬ 
lic policy of the U.S. was not to associate with the "foreign 
entanglements." Thus, in 1934, the Congress passed a Joint 
Resolution to prohibit the foreign sale of arms or munitions 
of war. Despite these policies, U.S. aircraft exports 
steadily flourished as the international situation deter¬ 
iorated. Aircraft exports surged upward with the exception 
of a brief downturn in 1935 which was due to the Nye Commit¬ 
tee hearings and the Neutrality Law. By 1938 they accounted 
for 46 per cent of the industry sales compared with 5.7 per 
16 
cent ten years ago. (See Table 8) Even when the U.S. 
total exports declined in 1938, aircraft exports increased 
73 per cent over the last year. Much of this rise was due 
to the fact that the U.S. was the only major supplier left 
out of the war. Consequently, the withdrawl of large pro¬ 
ducing countries from the world market left it open to the 
U.S. manufacturers. By 1937, the U.S. accounted for over 
45 per cent of the world's total aircraft exports. Exports 
sales of the rest of the world was $66 million compared to 
$68 million for the U.S. in 1938.^ This gap was further 
widened as the European War started in the late 1939. 
A new Joint Resolution on neutrality was enacted by 
Congress in 1939. This new resolution included provision 
for a "cash-and-carry" system. The lifting of the em- 
18 
bargo and the new Act benefited aircraft industry the most. 
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Table 8. Total Production and Extorts of Aviation Industry 
1925-1936 
(3illions of Dollars) 
Year Total 
✓ 
% of Exports to 
Production 
Expo 
1925 12.8 6.1 0.8 
1926 17.7 5.8 1.1 
1927 30.9 6.2 1.9 
1928 64.7 5.7 3.7 
1929 91.1 10.0 9.1 
1930 60.3 14. 5 S.S 
1931 43.5 10.0 4.9 
1932 34.9 22.8 7.9 
1933 33.4 27.5 9.2 
1934 43.9 40.2 17.7 
1935 42.5 33.7 14.3 
1936 73.1 29.6 23.1 
1937 115.1 34.2 39.4 
1938 150.0 45.5 68.2 
1939 225.0 52.0 117.1 
Source: Aircraft Production: U. S. Bureau of Air Ccmerce, 
Progress of Civil Aeronautics ir. the United States : 
■ ■ ^—— ■ i — —— ■ ■ -■ ■ ■ — ■ - ■ —— i ■ i — ■ ■ i . — 
<*«Gr c :<ews 
of the United States, 
1535.' 
Aeronautical 
2. WORLD WAR II AND REORGANIZATION 
* This study 
especially 
of the War 
Automobile 
ers, or of 
which ran 
Bouzlas 
dees not consider the role of the trade unions, 
of such leaders as Sidney Hi1Iran, Co-Chairman 
Production Board(W?3), or Walter Reuther of the 
Workers Union which then included aircraft vor.<- 
his brother Victor; or of the Government in 
ike Isacore Lubin of the White House Staff, U. 
wn, Robert R.R. Nathan and others of WFB. Unions 
and Government, of 
aircraft effort, 
rich literature on 
course, contributed rightly to the 
The interested reader ray consult a 
the war effort cited at reference ~ 24. 4. ■* . 
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As the U.S. entered the War the aircraft industry be¬ 
came an arsenal of democracy. By 1943, the U.S. aircraft 
industry had become the largest industry in the world and 
its product was one of the most crucial factors in winning 
the war. 
On January of 1942, President Roosevelt requested that 
aircraft production be increased to 125,000 units in 1945. 
Actual production in that year was 85,946 units. But, 
in terms of weight and performance, it produced more than 
the equivalent because of the emphasis on the production 
of heavier and faster aircraft. The War Production Board 
(WPB) Statistics reveals a dramatic shift of aircraft spe¬ 
cifications. The WPB calculated plane output for the 
period from 1941 to 1944 on the basis of the sizes, types 
and proportions produced 1942. The Board estimated that 
aircraft production in 1943 was equivalent 122,000 1942- 
type planes, and that the target of 100,000 units in 1944 
would be equivalent of 167,000 1942-type planes. Thus, 
the presidential goal was actually exceeded. This rapid 
expansion was made possible by the huge U.S. war expendi¬ 
ture of about $200 billion, of which aircraft procurement, 
- 20 
excluding armaments, was about twenty five per cent. 
The subject of greatest interest was production ef¬ 
ficiency, which increased approximately twenty-fold during 
that period. For the average monthly weight output per 
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employee, which was 28 pounds in 1941, was 125 pound in 
21 
1944. Improvement of performance was more or less sta¬ 
bilized since there was no time to design, develop and 
produce completely new models. 
The Aircraft War Production Council(AWPC) produced an 
interesting statistic on productivity. The AWPC cited 
the case history of a typical fighter plane from the first 
to the thousandth unit. Every doubling of the production 
meant an increase of 75 per cent in productivity. By 
the time a thousand units had been produced productivity 
increased by twentyfold. (See Table 9-) 
Table 9. Productivity Improvement in Each Production Level 
Number of Units Change of types Man-hours 
1st A 157,000 
10th A 59,000 
13th B 59,000 
90th 3 50,000 
100th ‘ C 26,500 
700th C 19,500 
1000th C-F 7,800 
Source: R.M. Cleveland and F.P. Graham(eds.), The Aviation 
Annual of 1945, Garden City: Doubleday , Doran & 
Co., 1944, p. 78. 
The production history of the four-engine bomber demon¬ 
strates the same point. The first aircraft required 
200,000 man-hours for construction: the 1,000th plane took 
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22,500 and the 2,000th only 13,000. In this case produc¬ 
tivity was increased sixteenfold. Another criterion of 
productivity is price. Production costs in 1944 was 
reduced by 20 to 40 per cent compared to the same plane 
built in 1942. Otherwise aircraft procurement would 
have cost more than $15 billion. For instance, in case 
of the B-24, the government ordered 1,200 B-24s at $238,000 
each in 1942. But in 1944, 4,500 additional B-24 were 
contracted at $137,000 each. The saving involved was 
roughly $100,000 on every B-24, amounted to half a billion 
dollars.^ This dramatic improvement in efficiency was 
due to the economies of scale as government procurement 
increased explosively. (See Table 10) 
Table 10. U.S. Aircraft Production 
1939 to 1945 
(Number of Aircrafts) 
Year Total Military Civil 
1939 5,856 2,195 3,661 
1940 12,813 6,028 6,785 
1041 26,289 19,445 6,844 
1942 47,675 47,675 
— 
1943 35,433 85,433 
— 
1944 95,272 95,272 
— 
1945 48,912 46,865 
2,047 
Source: A.erospace Industries Association of 
space Facts and Figures, Washington 
America, Aero- 
, D.C. , 195TT 
p. 6. 
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The crash development program produced favorable re¬ 
sults in a short time. For instance, Curtiss-Wright Pro¬ 
peller Division produced hollow steel blades for combat use. 
Hamilton Standard developed hydraulic pitch controls and 
other major propeller manufacturers also greatly increased 
research and development. The most prominent innovators 
were the Aeroproducts Division of General Motors and the 
American Propeller Corporation. In the instrument area, 
Sperry Gyroscope, RCA, Western Electric, and Bendix develop¬ 
ed countless revolutionary devices such as automatic pilots , 
automatic gunsights, automatic bomb sights, and navigation 
23 
systems. 
Above all, a revolutionary device developed during the 
war was the vast array of the subcontracting network. The 
factories best equipped to do a particular job did an•in¬ 
creasing share of the whole industry's work along those 
lines, and accordingly increased the efficiency of produc¬ 
tion. Non-aviation subcontractors, who had reluctantly 
accepted small orders, began to expand as they were assured 
a high demand for a product which they had learned to make 
efficiently. They became, in effect, departments of prime 
contractors. Others shifted from making many items to 
making a single or several units thus more efficiently. 
At the same time prime contractors disposed of small depart¬ 
ments as they expand further. 
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The net effect of this new system was profound: First, 
it put the aircraft industry on a mass-production basis. 
Second, it made prime contractors basically the designers 
and assemblers of aircrafts. Prior to the war they had 
turned raw materials into finished products. But now they 
are not aircraft builders or even engine, propeller, or in¬ 
strument producers in the prewar sense. By 1944, about 60 
per cent of the value of total production was added by sub¬ 
contractors. The varied output of subcontractors were dir¬ 
ected into a score of narrowing channels, each representing 
a different type of aircraft. At prime contractors’ assem¬ 
bly lines, the multitude of airplanes parts built elsewhere 
were checked, put together, and tested. The result was an 
enormous increase in productivity. ^ 
As the war was neared its end, the reorganization of 
the industry became a grave problem to all concerned. In 
1938, the industry consisted of a total of 15 companies. 
By 1940, this number had increased to 41 and in 1943 to 86 
factories including 5 plants in Canada. Total assets in¬ 
creased from $114 million in 1939 to $3.9 billion in 1944. 
Working force increased from a meager 48,638 in 1939 to 2.1 
million by the end of 1943. Demobilization of this gigan¬ 
tic working force was just as difficult a task as the mobi¬ 
lization of it. On V-J Day about $9 billion of contracts 
were cancelled. The net effect of cutback was the cancel- 
87 
lation of approximately 90 per cent of existing contracts. 
25 
Accordingly 1.1 million workers were laid off. 
The effect of the unemployment caused by the aircraft 
contract cancellation was of national concern, but the effect 
upon the surplus problem was of particular interest to the 
industry. A total 100,000 aircrafts and 50,000 spare en¬ 
gines were expected to be declared surplus. About 30 per 
cent of the first 40,000 aircrafts declared surplus were 
26 
sold or leases. The industry expressed grave concern 
over this matter. 
It argued that although disposing surplus is the eco¬ 
nomic course to follow in the short run it results in in¬ 
efficiencies in the long run. For example, World War I 
Liberty engines were carried on the stock list until 1932. 
The effect of this policy resulted in a halt of research 
and development on liquid-cooled engines, because there was 
no market for them. Thus when the Second World War Broke 
out the U.S. was far behind Europe just as it was 21 years 
earlier at the time of World War I. So was the case of the 
Liberty-engined reconnaissance aircraft operating until 
1935. Thus the aircraft industry argued that the policy 
of ’’holding on” to the surplus aircraft constituted a grave 
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menace to the technological progress of the industry. 
It further contended that small research and experimen- 
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tal contracts were not the solution to the pressing need 
for keeping ahead in the world of aviation, because of the 
time lag in development and production. In another war 
there would be no time to convert to wartime production as 
had happened in the last two wars. Therefore the produc¬ 
tion line is as essential as combat aircrafts in action. 
As time lag becomes longer, as aircrafts become more and 
more sophisticated and heavier, the thrust of this argument 
becomes stronger. 
The same argument holds for government owned facilities 
and equipments. Of the total of $3.7 billion expanded dur¬ 
ing the war, $3.4 billion were federally financed. Prewar 
privately finance facilities were valued at $114 million. 
Thus the government owned 90 per cent of the total facili- 
ties. Most postwar commercial transports, however, were 
modified wartime models with identical basic structure. 
Since complete assembly lines for the production of these 
were owned by the government, the industry could not produce 
commercial airliners until these facilities were disposed 
of. These industry proposals were adopted by the govern¬ 
ment and thus became the cornerstone of the U.S. aircraft 
industry. 
By the end of 1945, the government had cancelled con¬ 
tracts totaling $21.6 billion. Industry sales declined 
from a peak of $16 billion in 1944 to $1.2 billion in 1947 
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and only 16 out of the 66 aircraft companies remained in 
business. The most significant effect of this cancellation 
was on the rapid reduction in the employment level. The 
peak of 2.1 million was reduced to 1.5 million by V-E Day 
(May 8, 1945) and to 519,000 by V-J Day(August 14, 1945). 
A steady reduction continued until a bottom of 138,700 was 
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reached in 1946. The reduction of employment began even 
before the war ended. The expansion of production facili¬ 
ties ceased by the end of 1943 and airframe engine produc¬ 
tion after June, 1944; and propeller production after Jan¬ 
uary, 1944.^ 
Accordingly the aircraft industry prepared for the con¬ 
version to a peace time economy. Although civil aircraft 
production rose to about 35,000 planes in 1946, nearly five 
times that of the war year, military sales were still the 
bulk of the industry sales. It was important to achieve 
a balanced production policy in the military sector. Pro¬ 
cedures for orderly contract termination were adopted in 
1943 and were incorporated into the Contract Settlement Act 
of 1944.31 
In order to avoid needless disruption on the indus¬ 
try when military requirements disappeared, the contract 
termination process attempted to: 
1. Phase out the war contract as gradually as condi¬ 
tions permitted, 
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2. Prevent manufacturers and their subcontractors from 
being left with vast quantities of unusable inven¬ 
tory , and 
3. Provide some assistance in reconverting to peace 
time production. The normal pattern was for the 
subcontractors to cut back first, so that the in- 
32 
dustry gradually resumed its prewar structure. 
By 1950 the employment of the aircraft industry re- 
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covered to 224,900. This representing one-sixth of that 
o / 
of 1944 and three times that of 1940. And the industry 
produced 6,200 units with a total value of $1.4 billion re¬ 
presenting one tenth of that of 1944. In this process 
many new companies disappeared but the old companies that 
constituted the prewar industry remained. Out of the fif¬ 
teen major companies only two companies, McDonnell Aircraft 
corporation and Northrop Aircraft Incorporated were esta- 
blished during the war. And of the major companies in 
1940, only three Vega, Vultee, and Brewster failed to ap¬ 
pear on the 1950 list. This shows a striking stability of 
market share considering the erratic nature of demand. 
In the jet engine field, however, prewar patterns of 
the industry have been greatly disturbed. Nonaircraft com¬ 
panies, General Electric and Westinghouse, were granted 
government funds for research and development of jet-engines 
during the war while the established engine makers were re- 
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quired to concentrate on reciprocating engines. Consequent¬ 
ly the former took an early lead in jet engine production. 
The crippled aircraft industry after World War II re¬ 
covered instantly as the Korean War broke out in June, 1950. 
Military aircraft production increased from 2,600 units in 
1949 to 9,000 units in 1953 and the floorspace utilized was 
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doubled. This drastic change is shown in the following 
table 11. 
Table 11. * U.S. Aircraft Production 
1946-1956 
(Number of Aircrafts) 
Year Total Military Civil 
1946 36,418 1,147 35,001 
1947 17,739 2,122 15,617 
1948 9,838 2,536 7,302 
1949 6,137 2,592 3,545 
1950 6,200 2,680 3,520 
1951 7,532 5,055 2,477 
1952 10,640 7,131 3,509 
1953 13,112 8,978 4,134 
1954 11,478 8,089 3,389 
1955 11,484 6,664 4,820 
1956 12,408 5,203 7,205 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero¬ 
space Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1963,p. 7. 
Much of production increase was achieved by utilizing 
branch plants and by subcontracting work. The reason was 
that the government was reluctant to finance new investment 
when it already possessed much idle floor space and equip- 
92 
37 
ment. Aircraft manufacturers, on the other hand, found 
wartime facilities poorly suited for larger jet aircraft 
production. Thus, the decrease in government finance re¬ 
sulted in a larger private investment. This was also fa¬ 
cilitated by the Defense Production Act of 1950, which allow¬ 
ed producers to amortize new investment over a five-year 
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period for tax purposes. One of the reasons for such 
obsolescence was the increase in size and weight of the air¬ 
planes. 
Also the need for additional land space around plants 
became acute as the jet engine was introduced. Runways 
designed for propeller driven aircraft were no longer suit¬ 
able. Extending the old runways was often impractical be¬ 
cause of a noise problem and the development which had al¬ 
ready taken place around them. All in all, these events 
necessitated a large amount of private capital investment. 
The following table shows clearly that the private sector 
spent more during this period than it did during World War 
II period. 
There were three reasons why the industry invested its 
own money rather than wait for the government to invest. 
First, the government refused to finance expansion so long 
as usable facilities existed. Second, there was a huge de¬ 
mand for new machine tools requiring further development. 
The government preferred to employ its facility contracts 
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Table 12. Cost of Emergency Facilities Expansion 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Types of Investment Types of Finance 1940-1945 1950-1953 
Structures Private 212 805 
Federal 1,344 280 
Equipment Private 208 399 
Federal 2,130 2,044 
Source: R. Modley and T.S. Cawley, Aviation Facts and Fig¬ 
ures , 1953, Washington, Lincoln Press, Inc.” 1953, 
p"! Tl. 
to further machine tool development and to pay for the in¬ 
stallation of some of this equipment. As a result of this 
policy the government financed much of the new equipment, 
making the industry concentrate upon expanding other facili¬ 
ties. Third, the government offered accelerated deprecia¬ 
tion during the Korean War as it did during World War IX. 
This became the most powerful incentive for a firm to plow 
back its earning, although the straight five-year period 
was not quite as attractive as the World War II period of 
five years or the duration of the war which ever was 
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shorter. 
Accordingly, unless the government finances rixed 
assets, the industry must maintain them to meet the unpre¬ 
dictable cyclical swings in production. Such a capital 
structure would be a costly burden to both the private and 
public sectors in the long run. Therefore, the industry 
has been extremely cautious about expanding facilities oe 
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yond the point which they can be profitably employed during 
the low swings of the aircraft procurement cycle. For in¬ 
stance, during both wars, sales increased at a much faster 
rate than did fixed assets as shown in the following Graph 1. 
This is mainly due to the government policy on aircraft 
procurement. 
Graph 1. Net Book Value of Facilities and Sales of 12 
Major Airframe Companies, 1937-1954 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, ^ Avia- ^ 
tion Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 83 
There was the belief held throughout the industry that 
earnings were much too low to justify risky investment. 
Graph 2 shows earnings as a percentage of sales for 12 major 
95 
aircraft companies during the periods. Earnings as a per¬ 
centage of networth climbed much faster because of the wide 
employment of government-owned facilities. 
"Graph 2. Financial Ratios of 12 Major Aircraft 
Companies, 1937-1954 
1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 I9S0 >932 1954 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Avia¬ 
tion Facts and Figures, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 84. 
Government financing, however, provided government 
officials with an extremely potent control over the indus¬ 
try. Control factor was as a means of forcing the prime 
contractors to accept subcontracting in lieu of new plant 
construction. 
Government financing was predominant throughout the 
industry. The reasons are following: First, the aircraft 
industry, which had paid out 50 per cent of its eamings in 
96 
dividends, was in no position to tie up funds in non-produc- 
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tive plants and equipment. This dividend payout ratio 
is minimum since, the profit margin of the industry is sub¬ 
stantially lower than that of other manufacturing industries. 
Second, even if the government allowed profit margins to in¬ 
crease, the rapid expansion during a war would still require 
a huge public expenditure. 
However, there were few licensing arrangements as dur¬ 
ing World War II. Indeed the only two instances of major 
licensing were the formation of the B-47 pool with Boeing 
as the "design prime" and Lockheed and Douglas as the other 
prime contractors; and the Republic Aviation-General Motors 
agreement.42 There were two reasons for this absence of 
licensing. First, the over-all production never reached 
the World War II level. The peak production in 1953 was 
about 150 million pounds compared with 962 million pounds 
/ Q 
in 1944. Second, the 1939 expansion commenced with 9.5 
million square feet of floor space.being used whereas the 
Korean requirement were supported by an initial operating 
plant of over 60 million square feet plus a considerable 
44 number of government-owned reserve plants. Therefore, 
subcontracting, with its greater flexibility, had more ap¬ 
peal than the licensing arrangement for both concerned 
parties. 
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3. BIRTH OF AEROSPACE ERA 
Following the Korean War, the aircraft industry has 
experienced fundamental changes, namely the emergence of 
guided missiles and rapid expansion of space procurement. 
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Russia sent the first man¬ 
made object into orbit. Russian success shocked the Amer¬ 
ican public. Soon the National Aeronautics and Space Ad¬ 
ministration (NASA) came into being in the fall of 1958. 
Drawing initially from the defunct National Advisory Com¬ 
mittee for Aeronautics(NACA), the Navy Vanguard team, and 
the Army Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA grew into a large 
well organized unit by mid-1962 with a clearly defined goal 
of landing men on the moon, and returning them safely before 
the Russians did.^ 
Because of their superior speed in the delivery of 
destructive power, missiles are considered a superior sub¬ 
stitute for aircraft. Accordingly, the military aircraft 
market contracted abruptly while the missile market was ex¬ 
panding sharply. If the aircraft industry was to survive, 
it became obvious that either it diversify into other areas 
and expand its civil aircraft market or it had to adapt 
their production to missiles , the latter being the mere 
feasible alternative. The industry responded to the new 
challenge quickly. In 1959, the U.S. Aircraft Industries 
Association, Inc. changed its name to Aerospace Industries 
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Association of America, Inc., to reflect the changing na¬ 
ture of the effort. However, the transition to aerospace 
industry was not without its difficulties. 
The facilities for aircraft production were no longer 
economical for missile production. For instance, high- 
ceiling areas meant wasted space if they were to convert to 
missile production. This meant more adventurous capital 
investment in the private sector in order to survive in the 
new bom industry. In addition, missile production caused 
a great deal of change in the nature of labor force. Old 
jobs were destroyed and new ones were created as high tech¬ 
nology was achieved. Between 1954 and 1962 the percentage 
of hourly production workers dropped from 71.6 per cent to 
40 per cent of total employment as the proportion of more 
complex products increased.^ 
The aircraft industry, however, was able to adapt to 
the challenge imposed by the advent of the missiles. The 
following table 13 shows the new pattern of development. 
The six largest military contractors were also the largest 
contractors of missiles. Accordingly, high military sales 
levels depended upon capturing large missile contracts as 
the proportion of missile contracts in the defense procure¬ 
ment rapidly increased. For instance, Boeing became the 
second largest military contractor largely due to its suc¬ 
cessful missiles program while Douglas fell from number one 
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Table 13. Composition of Missile Sales in Military Sales 
of Nine Major Prime Contractors in Percentage 





1961 36.8 11.1 
Chance-Vought 1956 37.3 3.5 
1961 3.9 0.1 
Convair 1956 20.6 9.1 
1961 46.1 15.5 
Douglas 1956 1.4 1.0 
. 1961 39.3 3.9 
Lockheed 1956 _ — 
1961 69.4 17.3 
Martin 1956 9.7 2.3 
1961 87.5 13.6 
McDonnell 1956 2.8 0.4 
1961 18.9 1.4 
North-American 1956 0.01 - - 
1961 40.3 10.3 
Northrop 1956 33.7 7.3 
1961 35.5 1.2 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Statistical Ab- 
stracts of the United States, Washington", D. C. , 1959, 
I960, 19'6i: 
to six because of not being able to do so. (See iable 13) 
Accordingly, the structure of the aerospace industry 
has undergone substantial changes. Although the industry 
is principally made up of the same old companies, many new 
concerns entered into aerospace activities. Electronic 
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manufacturers became a much more important part of the aero¬ 
space industry in some instances even becoming the prime 
contractors for new weapon systems. On the other hand, 
some aircraft companies such as Chance-Vought and Douglas 
which did not have the foresight to prepare for the transi¬ 
tion into aerospace ended up as subcontractors to the more 
successful ones. In some instances conroanies were faced 
either merger or bankruptcy because of their inability to 
adapt to the new pattern of government procurement policy. 
Until the middle of 1950's aircraft companies were 
usually supplied with government furnished equipment(GFE) 
e.g. engines, propellers, and bombsights. The companies 
would then assemble the complete aircraft and deliver it 
to the military service. They virtually had no further 
relationship with the delivered aircraft, unless it was re¬ 
turned for improvements or modifications. In the missile 
program, however, aerospace companies were given full manage¬ 
ment responsibility in most cases. Not only did the com¬ 
panies assemble the finished missiles but they also designed 
the ground-support equipment to make it usable. They ma¬ 
naged deliveries of components and arranged production 
schedules under military supervision. They participated 
in selecting launching sites and were even involved in the 
actual site construction. And when the missiles became 
operational, field-service representatives of the airframe, 
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engine and guidance-systems producers accompanied military 
47 
personnel as trouble shooter. 
Consequently, customer-producer familiarity, as well 
as highly technically qualified personnel and related pro¬ 
duction experience became keys to retaining the ever in¬ 
creasing volume of missile procurements. The aircraft com¬ 
panies had an excellent foundation to start with. The air¬ 
craft companies, however, were in more competitive environ¬ 
ment than they had ever been before, Until then, previous 
experience in aircraft production was a prerequisite for an 
invitation to compete for such a government contract. On 
the government side, this procedure assures predictable per¬ 
formance of producer. Hence, the market was closed to new¬ 
comers because experience could not be gained without pro¬ 
duction, but production requires experience. The intro¬ 
duction of the missile, however, changed the whole picture 
since experience no longer provided such an insurmountable 
barrier to new competition. In some cases, electronic pro¬ 
ducers were found to be better qualified technologically 
than aircraft producers. By 1956, non-aircraft producers 
were prime contractors on 10 of 26 missile projects. 
This advent of the missile also rapidly devastated 
capital bases of the aircraft industry. Old facilities 
for aircraft production became technologically obsolete for 
missile production. Once again an extensive inflow of 
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capital was needed from the private sector. From 1956 
to 1961 the industry spent about $2 billion on facilities 
48 
for the development and production of missiles. 
In case of missile production, the degree of concentra¬ 
tion is even higher than that of aircraft production. In 
fact, the top five companies- Lockheed, Convair, Martin, Boe¬ 
ing, and North American- accounted for 91.5 per cent of 
missiles produced by aircraft companies and 68.3 per cent 
of the entire missile procurement.^ Missile sales by the 
aircraft industry steadily increased. Meanwhile, the 
structure of industry sales had changed too. Missile 
sales accounted for 44.4 per cent of the total industry 
sales in 1961 compared with 5.7 per cent in 1956. Also 
the ratio of aircraft industry missile sales to total 
missile sales increased from 23.5 per cent in 1956 to 74.7 
per cent in 1961.^ 
The aircraft industry's success in missiles can be 
attributed to its experience in responding to public po-. 
licy and its established position in handling government 
business. By the time the aircraft industry was well 
transformed into the aerospace industry in the early 1960's, 
the top six military aircraft producers were also well en¬ 
trenched as major missile producers. Thus the most signi¬ 
ficant feature of the U.S. aerospace industry in this per¬ 
iod was probably this "resilient response" to rapidly 
changing public policy.^ 
Table 14. 
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U.S. Aerospace Industry Sales by Customer 
1957 to 1976 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Year 
- Aerospace Products and Services Non-Aero- 






NASA and customers 
Others 
1957 15.9 12.8 1.6 1.4 
1958 16.1 13.2 1.4 1.4 
1959 16.6 13.2 0.1 1.8 1.5 
1960 17.3 13.2 0.4 2.2 1.6 
1961 18.0 13.9 0.6 1.9 1.6 
1962 19.2 . 14.3 1.3 1.8 1.7 
1963 20.1 14.2 2.6 1.5 1.3 
1964 20.6 13.2 3.6 2.0 1.7 
1965 20.7 11.4 4.5 2.8 2.0 
1966 24.6 13.3 5.0 3.7 2.6 
1967 27.3 15.9 4.2 4.6 2.6 
1968 29.0 16.6 3.9 5.9 2.5 
1969 26.1 15.8 3.3 4.3 2.7 
1970 24.9 14.6 3.0 4.6 2.6 
1971 22.2 12.6 2.7 4.3 2.5 
1972 22.8 13.3 2.6 4.3 2.6 
1973 24.8 12.9 2.4 6.2 3.3 
1974 26.4 12.7 2.5 7.2 4.1 
1975 28.4 13.1 2.7 7.7 4.8 
1976 29.3 13.4 2.8 7.8 5.3 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Aero- 
space Facts and Fizures 1977/1978, Washington"! ETC. , 
1977, p. 9T 
Th: is resili ence and creative response of the 
aerospace 
in dus t ry, how eve r, was to be tested again in the early 
1970’s. After the Vietn am war military procurement was 
reduced to $12.6 billion in 1971 from $16.6 billi 
on in 
1968.52 Also NASA contracts were reduced to $2.4 billion 
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Table 15. U.S. Aerospace Sales and the National Economy 
1960 to 1976 





National Product Manufacturing Goods In- Goods 
Industries dustry dus try 
1960 506 346 174 17 
1961 523 353 175 18 
1962 564 390 196 19 
1963 595 413 209 20 
1964 636 443 226 21 
1965 688 492 257 21 
1966 753 554 292 25 
1967 796 575 301 27 
1968 869 632 336 29 
1969 936 695 367 26 
1970 982 709 363 25 
1971 1,063 751 383 22 
1972 1,171 850 436 23 
1973 1,306 1,017 527 25 
1974 1,414 1,061 529 26 
1975 1,516 1,047 527 28 
1976 1,692 1,183 605 29 
Source: Gross National Product, Manufacturing,and Durable 
Goods Industries: Department of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business; Aerospace Industries Association, 
Aerosoace Facts and Figures 1977/1978, Washington, 
D.C. ,‘ 1977, p. 12. 
in 1973 from 5 billion dollars in 1966 as the Apollo project 
phased out.^ (See Table 14) To make matters worse, domes¬ 
tic demand for commercial transport became soft as airline 
profits deteriorated. Increased fuel costs and wages cou¬ 
pled with the higher price tag of wide-body jets can only 
hurt already depressed market. As a result of this, the 
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proportion of the aerospace industry in the gross national 
products steadily decreased. (See Table 15) 
Table 16. U.S. Exports and Exports of Aerospace Products 
1960 to 1976 










1960 20.4 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 
1961 20.8 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.8 
1962 20.4 1.9 0.3 0.7 1.0 
1963 23.1 1.6 0.2 0.5 0.9 
1964 26.2 1.6 0.2 0.6 0.8 
1965 27.1 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.8 
1966 29.9 1.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 
1967 31.1 2.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 
1968 34.2 3.0 1.2 1.1 0.7 
1969 37.5 3.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 
1970 42.6 3.4 1.3 1.2 0.9 
1971 43.5 4.2 1.6 1.5 1.1 
1972 49.0 3.8 1.1 1.8 • 0.8 
1973 70.2 5.1 1.7 2.1 1.4 
1974 97.2 7.1 2.7 2.6 1.8 
1975 106.1 7.8 2.4 2.9 2.5 
1976 113.3 7.9 2.5 3.2 2.2 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, '’U.S. Exports, Schedule B, 
Commodity and Country,” Report FT 410, ’’Highlights 
of U.S. Export and Import Trade," Report FT 990. 
Thus, the only alternative left to the aerospace in¬ 
dustry was to extend foreign markets. Fortunately, con¬ 
centration of wealth due to the oil crisis turned out to 
be a favorable factor for this case. The exports of aero¬ 
space products increased to $7.9 billion in 1976 from $1.7 
billion in only ten years. (See Table 16) 
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But this time both defense and state departments offi¬ 
cials became anxious for various reasons. First, the con¬ 
sequence of exporting military aircraft was not as simple 
as that of exporting lollypops. This may tilt the balance 
of power in any particular region. A friend of today may 
become an enemy of tomorrow and vice versa. 
Second, as the proportion of exports increases, the 
management of the aerospace industry tends to become less 
dependent on the government procurement. This may not be 
in accord with government policy. Consequently, the govern¬ 
ment began to interfere in the exporting procedure, in full 
scale. 
However, the U.S. aerospace industry is not in the 
same dominant position in the world market as it once was. 
The U.S. marketshare of the world market is reduced from 
86 per cent in 1960 to 68 per cent in 1975 and is projected 
to 60 per cent by 1985.^ European and Japanese aerospace 
industries as well as of Soviet Russia are increasingly com¬ 
petitive in both quality and price. The vacuum left by 
the U.S. aerospace suppliers was swiftly filled by the firm 
in the above countries. In the long run, therefore, res¬ 
trictive export policy on aerospace products may only weaken 
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CHAPTER IV. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE EXPORTS OF 
THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
If the story of the U.S. aerospace industry is a suc¬ 
cess story, then that of its British counterpart is a sad 
one. However, it is our proposition that public policy of 
both governments played an equally dominant role in deter¬ 
mining the destiny of the industry in each country. 
As recent as the 1950's, the British aircraft industry 
was well ahead of its U.S. counterpart. This is exempli¬ 
fied by the 3ritish Comet, the first commercial jet trans¬ 
port which went into airline service in 1952. This was a 
full six years ahead of a similar American aircraft, the 
Boeing 707. 
Such a lead is vital in securing a market3hare for 
once an airline establishes an association with a particu¬ 
lar aircraft manufacturer, it rarely breaks away. An air¬ 
line’s loyalty is based on economic reasoning to protect 
its investment. In the piston-engine era it was easier 
than at the present for an airline to change its fleet. 
However, with the coming of the jet airliner, airlines 
found it virtually impossible to switch from one manutac- 
turer to another since stocking huge inventories ar.c tram- 
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ing maintenance staffs for a new airliner are prohibitively 
high. The British aircraft industry, however, failed to 
capitalize on its vital lead due to the indecisiveness of 
the government about the fatal crashes of the Comet. 
By the time the Comet reentered the world market, all 
the major airlines were already committed to either Boeing 
or Douglas.^ So the British tried to recoup the market 
with the VC-10 which has a wider body and a longer range 
than the Boeing 707 or DC-8. At that time the British 
government made it clear that it would not import any more 
jet transports for its own airlines. But this was sudden¬ 
ly changed when BOAC cancelled its order on the basis of 
the higher operating cost of the VC-10, which had completed 
its maiden flight. It later became apparent that this 
decision was based upon insufficient information since 
passengers preferred the roomier and more comfortable 
VC-10. Since that time the British aircraft industry 
has never regained its technological superiority to the 
2 
U.S. aerospace industry. 
One of the main reasons for the failure of British air¬ 
craft industry was the feud between the Ministry of the Civil 
Aviation and the Ministry of Supply. Their constant fric¬ 
tions created too many stop-go decisions which resulted in 
too many prototypes and too few production models . In par- 
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ticular, the inefficiency of the Ministry of Supply which 
bought the airliners and sold them to the airlines was the 
prime weakness.^ 
Another reason for the success of the U.S. and failure 
of the British was the fact that the U.S. aerospace industry 
had exclusive access to the huge U.S. domestic market. The 
British industry did not have this advantage. About half 
of the world’s air transport operations were in the U.S.^ 
and penetration into this market by non U.S. firms has been 
almost impossible. This barrier existed even before the 
U.S. aerospace industry had attained any technological lead 
over its British counterparts. The relationship between 
industry and government in the U.S. and the resulting pub¬ 
lic policy played a crucial role in building this barrier. 
As discussed in the preceeding chapter, many types of 
restrictions other than tariffs can be imposed upon the aero¬ 
space imports. For instance, when Eastern Airlines announ¬ 
ced that it was going to lease four A-300s for the purpose 
of evaluation in 1977, the International Trade Commission 
immediately investigated the terms of the lease.^ Many 
Europeans were convinced that the loss of the Western Air¬ 
lines order for Airbus Industrie A-300, and refusal of the 
New York landing rights for the Anglo-French Concorde super¬ 
sonic transport are based on less obvious government and in¬ 
dustry pressures,^ 
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On the other hand, the British aerospace industry is 
characterized by a series of constant stop-goes, stemming 
from its abrasive and displeasing relationship with succes¬ 
sive Cabinets. This may be caused by the manner in which 
the British system of government works. The British sys¬ 
tem of government has ministers drawn from the Members of 
Parliament, who are professional politicians, while the 
senior civil servants are traditionally drawn from the Ci¬ 
vil Service. These along with the abrasive relationship 
between government and industry, make it extremely difficult 
to form sophisticated decisions such as an advanced fighter 
bomber project. One of the consequences of this situation 
is the thrash-about in the early stages of any new govern¬ 
ment . ^ 
In the U.S., the Executive Branch is basically run by 
professional administrators who are less political in deci¬ 
sion-making than professional politicians. Also the U.S. 
can finance more projects simultaneously and afford more 
mistakes which are inevitable in any frontier technology. 
The jobs resulting from aerospace projects are significant 
factors in decision making process when the public sector 
can afford the burden. Accordingly, the labor unions have 
always been fervent supporters of the aerospace industry. 
However, if the public sector cannot afford the cost, as in 
Britain, it becomes a totally different situation. The difler- 
ent relationships between the government and the industry ol 
115 
the U.S. and that of Britain presents an opportunity to 
test the validity of the dynamic externality theory dis¬ 
cussed in Chapter 3. 
2. PUBLIC POLICY; A KEY EXTERNAL DETERMINANT 
At the end of World War II, the British aircraft indus¬ 
try was in an ideal position to dominate the world market. 
In 1944, the industry was employing 1.8 million workers. 
Over 166,000 Rolls-Royce Merlin engines were built which 
amounted to more than any other engine built in aviation his- 
o 
tory. The first aircraft with a jet engine flew in 1941 
and the first production model of a jet-powered aircraft, 
Meteor, flew in 1944. The U.S. had to buy 400 Canberras 
when the U.S. industry could not produce what the Department 
of Defense wanted. 
Furthermore, British commercial aircrafts were being 
manufactured on a substantial scale. The Viking in parti¬ 
cular, achieved much success in the European market while 
the sales of the Dove totaled 550, of which one sixth had 
been sold to the U.S. The sales of the four-engined Heron 
exceeded 150. This is an indication of the technological 
10 
lead of the British aircraft industry at that time. 
However, after the fatal crashes of the Comet in 1954, 
the British aircraft industry lost its lead in technology to 
the U.S. The reasons were clear: First, because of the 
friction among governmental agencies there were many projects 
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which rarely went beyond the prototype stage. Also an in¬ 
consistent public policies taken by a frequently changing Ca¬ 
binets contributed to the disarray. Frightened by the alarm¬ 
ing level of deficit in budget and the balance of payments, 
any incoming Cabinet would be tempted to delete appropria¬ 
tions for aerospace research and development which was large 
enough to affect the fiscal position.^ 
Second, the expenditures on aerospace research and de¬ 
velopment actually decreased: the first available data for 
this purpose was 138 million pounds in 1961, and 159 million 
12 
pounds in 1971. Considering the devaluations of the pound 
during that period and the inflation, real funds available 
for research and development actually steadily decreased. 
Third, the two research institutions established to ad¬ 
vise the aircraft industry were mainly concerned with pure 
research, and not the practical problems of production. 
Originally the Aerodynamics Department of the National Phy¬ 
sical Laboratory dealt with the theoretical issues while the 
Royal Aircraft Factory actually built the aircraft and the 
engines until World War I. The industry, however, grew 
jealous of the factory's position and exerted sufficient 
pressure to halt the factory work. The institution was then 
renamed, the Royal Aircraft Establishment(RAE). The RAE 
was to provide aerodynamic information on current aircraft 
problems and research on advanced aircraft design. The FAE, 
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however, was not permitted to produce the aircraft itself. 
This placed the RAE in an unfortunate position for it had 
to advise the industry without being fully aware of some 
13 
of the major problems faced by the manufacturers. 
Fourth, the British domestic market for aerospace 
products was limited compared to that of the U.S. Other 
countries with this problem were forced to purchase U.S. 
aircraft which gave them a great advantage of a well-spread 
out overhead development cost. The size of the domestic 
market, however, is not an unsurmountable barrier, although 
it poses a serious obstacle. For instance, Swiss watch 
makers with a small domestic market have long taken over 
the world market. But in order to overcome this, a coun¬ 
try with a small domestic market such as Britain should 
have limited the scope of the industry and concentrated on 
a specific portion of the market. This might have increased 
their technical edge over the competitors. 
Finally, the entangled government relationship is no 
less important than any of the other problems. The Mini¬ 
stry of Aviation was responsible for civil aerospace and the 
procurement of military aircraft prior to 1967. These func¬ 
tions were assumed by the Ministry of Technology and the Mi¬ 
nistry of Defense. In 1970, the Ministry of Technology and 
Board of Trade became part of the Department of Trade and 
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industry. Although that Department continued the Board of 
Trade's responsibility for civil aviation, the Ministry of 
Technology's responsibility for aerospace research, develop¬ 
ment and procurement and sponsorship of the aerospace indus¬ 
try was transferred to a separate and temporary Ministry of 
Aviation Supply. 
In 1971, the Ministry of Aviation Supply was replaced 
by the Ministry of State for Defense. A Ministrial Aero¬ 
space Board is to be set up consisting of the Secretaries of 
State for Defense and Trade and Industry, to oversee collab¬ 
oration between the two departments and became the authority 
for instructions and policy guidance on the industry.^ 
This makeshift public policy and scattered responsibility im¬ 
peded the development of the aerospace industry in which pa¬ 
tient support and understanding is necessary. Whenever, a 
new institution took over the responsibility of overseeing 
the industry, it was more concerned with the imputation of 
what went wrong rather than how to solve the problem under 
these circumstances. Nobody wanted to take the risk of pro¬ 
moting a daring new project. In the long run, this probably 
hurt the British aerospace industry more than anything else. 
The British government which was desperate to rejuvenate 
its troubled aerospace industry, combined more than a dozen 
firms into two major airframe manufacturers and one engine 
manufacturer in 1974.^ British Aircraft Corporation ana 
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Hawker-Siddeley are concerned with airframe manufacturing 
and Rolls Royce with engine manufacturing. Finally two air¬ 
frame manufacturers were merged into the British Aerospace 
Corporation in 1977. ^ 
All of this demonstrates the crucial role of public po¬ 
licy in the development of the aerospace industry. As we 
saw above, these five critical factors are directly and in¬ 
directly affected by public policy. In most cases of model 
building public policy tends to be left out as an external 
factor since there is no way to quantify public policy. For 
instance, how could one quantify the impact of Sandy's Defense 
White Paper, which indicated that the manned fighter was dead 
and that in the future reliance would be placed on missiles? 
Yet the impact of this paper on the British aerospace indus¬ 
try, which was disregarded by the British govem- 
ment later, can hardly be exaggerated. However, any model 
which leaves out such an important external factor as govern¬ 
ment policy is likely to be unrealistic. If public policy 
is included, its effects are difficult to quantify directly. 
Thus an appropriate way to consider public policy is to em¬ 
ploy a historical method of analysis where relevant. This 
is probably the most we need to consider in the decision mak¬ 
ing process, since decision making is basically dicnotomical 
no matter how sophisticated it may look. 
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3. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Defense and space policies dictate the bulk of research 
and development activities in the U.S. due to the fact that 
the technological advancement of weapon systems is crucial 
to national security. Unintentionally, however, these pub¬ 
lic policies affect the whole economy in various ways. Its 
impact on the U.S. aerospace export is substantial, although 
this is not limited to the aerospace industry. 
Keesing has stated that there is a powerful correlation 
between the intensity of E&D activity in American industries 
19 
and their export performance. Also a Brookings study in¬ 
dicated that technology is the key determinant of the rate 
of production and general economic progress. That does 
not mean that other factors such as inflation, wage differen¬ 
ces, and foreign exchange rate do not affect the export posi¬ 
tion . Pc t, as far as aerospace exports are concerned, tech¬ 
nological advancement is the single most important factor and 
the public policy on R&D directs it. 
The U.S. aerospace industry receives about one half of 
all of the federal expenditure on nil- This incus try a.sc 
con cruets 25 per cent of all industrial huD' Tsis accounts 
for 21 ter cent of the total sa~es of the . > aercapa ■ . 
cue try 'lee Table 17, 
. ce incortance of research and development to tr.e : o .s- 
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Table 17. U.S. Industrial Research and Development; 
All Industries and the Aerospace Industry 
1960 to 1975 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Year 
All Industries Aerospace Industry R & D Aerospace 
R 6c D Total Government Private Sales 
1960 10.5 3.5 3.2 .4 17.3 
1965 14.2 5.1 4.5 .6 20.7 
1970 18.1 5.2 4.0 1.2 24.9 
1975 23.5 5.7 4.5 .2 28.4 
Sources: Compiled from National Science Foundation, Research 
and Development in Industry, Washington, D.C., 1967, 
1973, 1975. 
try is also portrayed by the structure of employment. As of 
1976, the U.S. aerospace industry employed 19 per cent of all 
scientists and engineers in the country. At the peak of the 
indus try in 1965, it employed 29 per cent of the total. (See 
Table 18 ) 
Table 18. Employment of Scientists and Engineers for 
Research and Development in the U.S. 
1960 to 1975 
(As of December 31 of each Year) 
Year Tatal Aerospace Aerospace/Total 
d) 
1960 292,000 72,400 24.8 
1965 343,600 99,200 28.9 
1970 384,100 92,600 24.1 
1975 360,400 67.600 18.8 
Source: Compiled from National Science Foundation, Research 
and Development in Industrv, Washington, D.C.,1967, 
1973, 1$75" 
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This concentration of scientists and engineers in the indus¬ 
try is understandable since the growth of the industry total¬ 
ly depends upon its technological capability. More than 
most industries, the aerospace industry's sales have direct¬ 
ly resulted from its research and development activity. 
Much of industrial research and development activities, how¬ 
ever, focused on product improvement and applied areas. 
Thus most of the basic research and high risk - high cost 
activities in the aerospace area have to rely upon government 
finance. In this regard, the U.S. aerospace industry is in 
a very fortunate situation. About SO per cent of aerospace 
research arid development is funded by the Federal Government, 
This is 20 times the proportion that the British aerospace in- 
21 
dustry is assisted by the British Government. 
Table 19 shows the the trend in expenditure the U.S. 
aerospace research and development and that of Britain. It 
seems inevitable that with such a tremendous edge in public 
expenditure on research and development, the U.S. aerospace 
industry would surpass its British counterpart. However, 
# 
one should also note that the proportion of the U.S. aero¬ 
space research and development expenditure to that of the 
total industry is steadily decreasing over time. This trend 
was noticeable since 1969 when the U.S. aerospace research 
and development expenditure actually decreased, 
ly, the productivity of the industry stabilized. 
Consequent- 
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Table 19. Research and Development Expenditure in the 
U.S. and Britain 
1956 to 1975 









1956 6.6 2.2 N. A. .8 
1960 10.5 3.5 .3 1.8 
1965 14.2 5.1 .3 2.6 
1070 18.1 5.2 .2 2.6 
1975 23.5 5.7 .5 N. A. 
Sources: Compiled from, Central Statistical Office, Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, 1955-1976, Her Majesty * s 
Stationery Office, London; Aerospace Industries 
Association of America, Aerospace Facts and Figures, 
Washington, D.C,, 1959, 1963,19 777 
Owing to the spurt of technological advancement, aero¬ 
space exports increased not only in terms of absolute amount 
but also in relative proportion to total export. (See Table 20) 
In particular, the proportion of the aerospace exports to 
the U.S. net balance of trade becomes increasingly important 
as the balance of trade deteriorates. As a matter of fact, 
the national interest of monopolizing a superior weapon sys¬ 
tem and that of earning valuable foreign exchange have been 
constantly conflicting with each other. So whenever the 
balance of trade position gets weak, the latter position be¬ 
comes strongert and vice versa. This conflict is inevitable 
since aerospace exports in 1976 accounted for 45 per cent of 
all shipments by the U.S. aerospace industry and provided 
170,000 full-time jobs according to the U.S. Commerce Depart- 
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Table 20. U.S. Total Exports and Aerospace Exports 
1946 to 1975 
Year (A) Total (B)Aerospace B/A(%) Aerospace Trade Bal 
Exports Exports ance as Percent of 
U.S. Trade 
1946 9.5 .12 1.2 2.6 
1950 10.1 .24 2.4 14.2 
1955 15.4 .73 4.7 17.4 
1960 20.6 1.33 6.5 31.0 
1965 27.3 1.47 5.4 24.9 
1970 42.6 3.40 8.0 109.3 
1975 106.1 7.79 7.3 73.2 
Sources : Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the 
U.S., 1976,1956, Aerosp ace Facts and Figures, Wash- 
ington, D. C., 1963, 197 7. p. 107T 
ment statistics. Overall aerospace exports in 1977, valued 
at approximately $8.4 billion, will be the largest single 
contributor to the U.S. balance of trade, accounting for $8 
22 
billion after- offsetting imports. 
The most interesting aspect of the aerospace export mar¬ 
ket is yet to be explained. Once the U.S. aerospace indus¬ 
try attained a comparatively advantageous position in the 
market, there is no compelling reason to reverse this, for 
European countries, according to the comparative advantage 
theory, can benefit most from concentrating in what they are 
relatively best at. However, the European countries did 
exactly the opposite of what comparative advantage theory ex¬ 
pected them to do. And the result was successful! This 
suggests that comparative advantage theory is insufficient 
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Table 21. Productivity in the Aerospace Industries 
1960 to 1972 
(Constant 1970 U.S. dollars) 
Year U.S. Britain France Germanv 
1960 16,132 4,129 9,329 N. A. 
1961 16,421 4,694 9,123 N. A. 
1962 15,088 4,471 9,455 N. A. 
1963 15,891 4,637 9,745 N.A. 
1964 17,034 5,362 11,314 N. A. 
1965 17,591 6,286 10,121 6,597 
1966 17,898 6,571 10,906 5,114 
1967 18,374 6,264 12,318 10,031 
1968 19,280 6,512 11,290 11,144 
1969 18,635 6,952 12,023 10,455 
1970 21,381 6,409 12,451 13,125 
1971 23,329 7,036 13,074 15,485 
1972 26,907 6,863 13,946 18,773 
1972 27,810 7,045 18,098 23,204 
Sources: Compiled from Aerospace Industries Association of 
America, Aerospace Facts and Figures 1975/1976, 
Washington, D.C. , pp. 9, 123,188; Interavia, May 
1969, p. 517, December, 1970, p. 1501 May 1971, 
p. 513; July 1972, p. 751; June 1975, p. 616; 
September 1975, p. 952; September 1976, p. 825; 
British Industry Today, Aerospace, H.M.S.O., 
London, 1972, pp. 5-7. 
at best, in explaining the behavioral patterns of the air¬ 
craft industry in foreign trade. 
Table 21 shows the productivity of the aerospace 
industries in four countries. Productivity is defined in 
terms of the total real industry sales divided by the total 
employment of the industry of each country. This indicates 
that the productivity of the U.S. aerospace industry is the 
highest among the four. However, this also points out that 
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the productivity of the French and German aerospace indus¬ 
try increased faster than that of the U.S. aerospace indus¬ 
try. 
Table 22. Research and Development Expenditures 
1961 to* 1973 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Year U. S. France West Germany Britain 
R & D Public 
(%) 
R 6c D Public 
(%) 




1961 14.6 66 1.0 64 1.8 45 1.8 58 
1963 17.4 72 1.3 64 1.4 49 2.2 54 
1966 22.3 68 2.2 70 2.2 49 2.6 52 
1970 26.9 55 3.2 70 3.0 47 2.7 51 
1973 30.6 55 6.0 70 
Sources: Compiled from UNESCO, Science Policy and Organiza¬ 
tion of Research in the Federal Republic of^Germany, 
pT 58; Science Policy News, January 1970; Science 
News, 1970; OECD, A Study of'Resources Devotee to 
R & D in OECD Member Countries in 1963-1964, Paris, 
1967/8; U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Ab¬ 
stract of the U.S., 1962, 1964, 1967, 1971, and 1974. 
This may be explained by the fact that the growth rate 
of the U.S. government R&D funding has decreased from 9 per 
cent to one per cent annually since 1966 while that of 
France experienced about 13 per cent and West Germany 30 
per cent.23 (Table 22 exhibits the trend of the research and 
development of key countries) From this table we can see 
that France with the largest proportion of public funding 
on R6eD achieved significant increment in productivity. 
West Germany attained a better performance with least pub- 
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lie commitment due to the efficient private sector. Never¬ 
theless, this is because of the more rapid increase in pri¬ 
vate funding on R&D rather than a decrease in public funding. 
Table 23 conforms a consistent relationship between 
the growth rate of R&D expenditure and that of productivity 
in four countries. R&D elasticity was used as a measure 
of efficiency by dividing the former by the latter during 
the nine year period. Understandably, the U.S. being the 
explorer in many frontier areas has low elasticity and the 
West Germany the highest benefiting from already proven 
technology. The unusually low figure for France, however, 
is due to a sudden spurt of R&D expenditure in the last 
few years of the period. (See Table 22) 
Table 23. Average Annual Growth Rates of R&D Expenditure 
and Productivity in Four Countries 
1963 to 1972 
(in Percentage) 
Year U.S. Britain France West Germany 
R&D 5.9 3.0 16.5 11.3 
Productivity 6.5 4.5 7.5 19.5 
R&D Elasticity 1.10 1.50 0.45 1.73 
Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce, Statis- 
tical Abstract of the U.S., 1962, 1964, 1967~j 1971, 
and 1974; Interavia, May 1969, December 1970, May 
1971, July 1972, June 1975; Science Policy News, 
January 1970; Science News 1970; Aerospace Facts 
and Figures, 1975. 
As the productivity of the U.S. aerospace industry de- 
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dined relative to the European countries, the U.S. market- 
share of the world market declined. In 1960, the U.S. ac¬ 
counted for 86 per cent of the total market. (See Table 24) 
If the projections are realized, that share will drop 
below 60 per cent by 1985. At the same time, the European 
marketshare would increase from 11 per cent of the total 
market of $18.4 billion in 1960 to 31 per cent of $52 bil- 
lion in 1985.24 
Table 24. World Market for Aerospace Products 
1960 to 1985 








1960 18.4 86 11 
1964 23.1 82 14 
19 70 27.9 80 15 
1975 35.3 68 25 
1980(a) 45.4 65 27 
1985(a) 52.0 60 31 
Source: Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York, McGraw 
Hill Co., June 6, 1977, pp. 82-83. 
(a) Market Projection Figures 
This implies that the European aerospace industry does 
not necessarily conform itself to comparative advantage 
theory in setting a developmental strategy. This is so be¬ 
cause the comparative advantage itself is not a key element 
of foreign trade nor an active factor in the economic beha¬ 
vior of both the government and the industry. It is simply 
129 
a symptom and a result of the economic and political reali¬ 
ties. Only real factors (public policy and the industry's 
creative responses in this case) can change the realities 
and thus the symptoms. Although there seems to be some 
relationship between the symptoms and the concerned pheno¬ 
mena, this is only so on the surface. The above observa¬ 
tion does not necessarily apply to every industry nor to 
every economy. But this has been so in the case of the 
aerospace industries in the U.S. and Western Europe. The 
argument, presumably, may be extended to other countries 
with sufficient skilled manpower and firm determination 
to develop their own high-technology industrial base. 
4. GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND TAX POLICY 
Traditionally, there are four ways to raise capital 
for a corporation; retained earnings, debt financing, equity 
financing, and depreciation allowance. Profit levels, how¬ 
ever, direct all of these in one fashion or another, since 
both the cost of capital and the size of capital which the 
corporation can raise directly or indirectly depends upon 
profit. In the case of the aerospace industry, the profit 
level is determined by public policy in various ways since 
an appreciable portion of sales are generated by the govern¬ 
ment; while still more of the non-governmental sales, such 
as the military aerospace exports, are directed by govern- 
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ment. (See Table 25) Therefore profit policy set by the 
government affects cost of the capital so profoundly that 
it does not make any sense at all to look into the indus¬ 
try’s behavior without looking into this matter. 
Table 25. Sales of Major U.S. Aerospace Companies by 
Customer 1950 to 1975 
Billions of Dollars 
(Percentage in Parenthesis) 
Year Total U.S. Government Other 
1950 3.1 2. 6 (84) 0.5 (16) 
1955 12.4 10. 5 (85) 1.9 (15) 
1961 14.9 11. 8 (79) 3.2 (21) 
1965 17.0 12. 5 (74) 4.5 (26) 
1970 24.8 16. 4 (66) 8.3 (34) 
1975 29.2 17. 2 (59) 12.0 (41) 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Reports, 
Series MO 37D; Aerospace Industries Association of 
America, Aerospace Facts and Figures,1976/1977, 
Washington, D. C. , 1977. 
In this regard contrasting features of the profit policy 
of the U.S. and that of Britain offers outstanding opportu- 
t 
nity to assess the impact of public policy on corporate fi¬ 
nance and subsequential performance. Overall prospects of 
profit for the U.S. aerospace industry have been more favor¬ 
able than that of the European countries, particularly of 
Britain. This stems from contrasting approaches used to 
determine contractor fees for negotiated defense contracts. 
The U.S. system bases the target contract profit on the char¬ 
acteristics of the inputs furnished by the contractor and 
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other features of the contract. On the other hand, the Bri¬ 
tish system computes the contract profit rate according to 
return on assets, adjusted for other features of the contract. 
These two different policies of profit computation have a 
crucial impact on entrepreneurial motivations. 
a. THE U.S. PROFIT SYSTEM 
The U.S. system offers flexibility of differentiating 
among different types of inputs. Thus through its profit 
policy the government can encourage contractors to acquire 
certain skills and capabilities and discourage them from ac¬ 
quiring others. For instance, the contractor can improve 
profit by performing tasks which require relatively large 
25 
amounts of engineering work. 
In the U.S. system, profit determination consists of 
two steps. First, the target cost of the contract is deter¬ 
mined by applying cost analysis principles. Second, a tar¬ 
get profit rate is determined by multiplying these two fig¬ 
ures . 
The base to which the profit rate is applied is obtain¬ 
ed by estimating the expenditures required to fulfill the 
contract. Direct costs have to be both "allocable" and 
"allowable," as defined in the Armed Service Procurement Re¬ 
gulation. (ASPR) Indirect cost is reimbursed based on a set 
This determination of the target cost is overhead rate. 
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governed by a number of complex and controversial cost prin¬ 
ciples, which sometimes exclude from allowable cost outlays 
2 6 
commonly regarded as ordinary business expenses. 
The profit rate applied to the cost base is determined 
by a system called weighted guidelines(WGL). The first com¬ 
ponent of the profit rate is based upon the characteristics 
of the inputs which the contractor furnishes. The formal 
designation of this component is Contractor's Input to Total 
Performance. This portion of the fee is designed to dis¬ 
courage profit pyramiding, which is earning excessive profits 
through the cost of items produced hy subcontractors. It 
also encourages firms which use engineering labor and other 
specialized skills. Accordingly, the Input to Total Perfor¬ 
mance factor results in a higher profit rate for firms engaged 
in sophisticated in-house activities relative to firms doing 
a large amount of subcontracting. 
The second component of the profit rate consists of sev¬ 
eral factors (or below the line factors) that reflect the 
degree of cost risk, the past performance of the contractor 
and the "selected factors." The most important factor is 
the degree to which the Contractor relies on Government faci¬ 
lities. To compute the Contractor's Input to Total Perfor¬ 
mance, the total estimated cost is divided into eight cata- 
gories; direct material, engineering labor, manufacturing 
labor, special tooling, engineering burden, manufacturing 
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burden, general and administrative expenses, and royalties. 
The ASPR specifies a range of profit rates for each factor. 
The contracting officer selects from within these ranges spe¬ 
cific profit rates. The rates are multiplied by the esti¬ 
mated cost allocated to each expense category. This multi¬ 
plication yields a profit on each expense category. Adding 
up this profit and dividing it by the estimated cost yields 
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the basic target rate up to a maximum of 7 per cent. 
This rate is then modified by the '’below the line" fac¬ 
tors. The risk factor depends upon the type of contract, 
the reliability of the cost estimate, and the difficulty of 
the contractor's task. Put differently, risk, for profit 
purposes, is essentially defined by the pricing arrangement 
and the method of source selection. Allowance for the past 
performance is designed as an incentive for efficiency and 
high quality work. It can increase or decrease the profit 
rate by as much as two percentage points. 
The "selected factors" can result in the subtraction of 
up to two per cent from the profit rate. The most important 
consideration here is the amount of Government furnished fa¬ 
cilities and equipment used. A firm with no such facilities 
would have no subtraction, but a firm with extensive use of 
3uch facilities could penalized by the subtraction of two 
percentage points. Thi3 is used to motivate contractors to 
inve s t. 
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The main determinant of the profit rate in the U.S. 
system is the nature of the underlying cost base. Thus a 
firm with substantial inputs of direct labor, particularly 
engineering labor, will have very high target profit rate. 
On the other hand, a very capital intensive firm using small 
amounts of "unsophisticated" labor skills will have relative¬ 
ly low profit rates. Converting these rates of return on 
the cost base to rates of return on assets, the former firm 
will earn a higher profit rate on its investment compared to 
the latter firm. 
However, the Department of Defense(DOD) policy is not 
the only factor which affects the profit level of the indus¬ 
try. The Renegotiation Eoard which was originally establish 
ed as an independent agency to control general price-wage- 
profit levels during the World War II is directly responsible 
Renegotiation has been maintained on the rationale that it 
permits contract prices to reflect the change in any pro¬ 
duction condition which was unforeseen when the contract 
was negotiated. Thus the Renegotiation Board is primarily 
engaged in backstopping the contracting process by providing 
an opportunity for a retrospective view of the costs upon 
which the prices were based. The Board, nevertheless 
makes no attemptes to determine an appropriate rate of re¬ 
turn on capital. It simply judges the application of each 
of the statutory factors enumerated above to the facts of 
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the following cases: 
1. reasonableness of costs and profits, 
2. net worth, particularly the amount of Government fur¬ 
nished plant and equipment, 
3. risk assumed, 
4. nature and extent of contribution to the defense ef¬ 
fort , 
5. character of the business, 
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6. other factors the Board may adopt. 
Therefore, DOD procurement policy remains the main frame¬ 
work of computing profits which affects the financial struc¬ 
ture of the U.S. aerospace industry directly and indirectly. 
The U.S. system, however, does have some weak points. 
One of these is the inadequate, and indirect treatment of 
the contractor's investment. The only explicit allowance 
for the contractors investment is the penalty leveled again¬ 
st firms utilizing Government-furnished facilities. Profit 
policy does not distinguish between the capital intensive 
work and the labor intensive work. Thus the U.S. system 
discriminates aginst capital intensive firms. This has 
not been much of a problem for the large aerospace companies 
since they are all relatively labor intensive. (See Table 26; 
Many of the subcontractors which are classified as other 
manufacturing industries, however, are engaged more in manu¬ 
facturing than in assembly and integration, and are therefore 
more capital intensive. 
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Table 26 Assets Per Employee Among the 500 Largest 
Industries in the U.S. 
THE INDUSTRY MEDIANS 
Petroleum refining $196,927 
Mining, crude-oil production 114,898 
Broadcasting, motion-picture 70,434 
Beverages 69,026 
Tobacco 65,298 
Metal manufacturing 57,272 
Chemicals 54,212 
Paper,fiber, and wood products 47,587 
Pharmaceuticals 40,923 
Soaps, cosmetics 36,885 
Publishing, printing 36,468 
Food 36,463 
Industrial and farm equipment 33,893 
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 33,705 
Glass, concrete, abrasives, gypsum 32,780 
Metal products 30,625 
Office equipment 30,112 
Motor vehicles 29,754 
Rubber, plastic products 28,913 
Scientific equipment 28,838 
Electronics, appliances 25,239 
#Aerospace 23,954 
Textiles, vinylflooring 21,254 
Apparel 14,991 
Toys, sporting goods N.A. 
Leather N.A. 
Furniture N.A. 
Jewelry, silverware N.A., 
All Industries 37,939 
Source: Fortune, May, 1976. 
The administrative advantage of the U.S. system is that 
the government can avoid explicit decisions about the net 
profit requirements for specific firms. This, however, ne¬ 
cessarily works aginst economizing the cost of defense con¬ 
tracts. Nevertheless, from the industry's point of vieT.v 
this is the most advantageous for capital accumulation. 
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b. THE BRITISH PROFIT SYSTEM 
The British defense profit system regulates the rate of 
return on the original cost of assets in a manner similar to 
that of the public utility and transportation industries in 
the U.S. This system requires three separate decision sta¬ 
ges : 
1. the composition and value of the asset base, 
2. the appropriate target rate of return to be applied 
to the asset base, 
3. a set of contract profit rates that could yield the 
required profit. 
The British system uses an original cost, less deprecia¬ 
tion approach. However, certain corporate assets are usual¬ 
ly excluded. For instance, good will, investments in stocks 
and securities, excess cash, and loans to subsidiaries are 
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excluded from the computation of the assets base. 
In converting target profits of investment to a target 
rate of return on contracts, the British system views the 
firms as a single unit. Thus the precise rate of return on 
the capital devoted to any particular contract is not calcu¬ 
lated. Then turnover ratio is obtained through dividing 
the contractor’s assets, by total cost of production for the 
previous year. Multiplying this by the target rate of re¬ 
turn on assets yields a target rate of return on contract 
cost without determining an asset rate base for each con- 
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Since the capital intensities of various projects differ, 
a firm will make more than the target rate of return on some 
assets and less on others. Also, if the turnover ratio in 
a given year differs from that of the previous year, then 
the actual rate of return on assets will differ from the tar¬ 
get. If the firm has more sales than expected, the actual 
rate of return on assets will be greater than anticipated. 
If turnover is less, profits will also be less. In other 
words, the British profit system is based on computation of 
a turnover ratio and the actual profits will depend upon the 
degree to which the sales expectations are fulfilled. Thus 
actual profit tends to diverge from the target rate of return. 
This also makes profit rates of the British industry lower 
than that of its U.S. counterpart since the aerospace indus¬ 
try is not a capital-intensive industry. (See Table 27) 
Under the British system, the industry is encouraged to 
invest more plant and equipment than the U.S. system which 
relates fee to the total cost. On the other hand, the U.S. 
aerospace industry has more room for profit since the target 
profit is computed on the basis of cost which is easier to 
inflate than asset base. Consequently, overall profit rate 
of the U.S. industry has always been better than that of Bri¬ 
tish industry. Table 28 exhibits the trend of the aerospace 
industry's rate of return on net assets in both countries. 
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Table 27 The Aerospace Industry's Rate of Return on 
Net Assets in the U.S. and Britain 
(in percentage) 
Year U.S. Britain 
1956 35 19 
1957 31 16 
1958 23 13 
1959 14 11 
1960 10 9 
1961 14 6 
1962 18 7 
1963 17 9 
1964 18 6 
1965 23 N. A. 
1966 20 N. A. 
1967 16 N. A. 
1968 18 N. A. 
1969 13 N. A 
1970 7 N. A. 
1971 6 N. A. 
1972 9 N. A 
1973 11 N. A 
1974 11 N. A. 
1975 10 N. A. 
1976 13 N. A. 
Sources: Compiled from Aerospace Industries Assciation of 
America; Aerospace Facts and Figures, Washington D C 
1963, pp. 80-3, 1968, pp. 92-93, 1972/1973, pp. 104- 
105, 1977/1978, pp. 131-132, and Plowden Report, Lon¬ 
don, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965.* 
No comprehensive industrial data are available for British 
industry since Plowden Report came out in 1965. 
This low profit rate along with small procurement made 
the British industry incapable of accumulating the necessary 
capital base. Ultimately, this led to the nationalization 
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of the British aerospace industry. Reflecting back, it 
would have been much wiser and economical for Britain to 
allow sufficient profit in order to develop its aerospace 
industry internationally rather than to make it so lean that 
ultimately the government would have to bear the whole bur¬ 
den. 
5. EXPORT POLICY AND EXPORT PATTERN 
Government influence upon the export promotion of aero¬ 
space products is something of a myth throughout recent his¬ 
tory. However, we can gain some understanding of its essence 
through a few publicized facts. 
Traditionally, the U.S. has considered Latin America as 
the arena of its influence. Thus, when Israel tried to ex¬ 
port Kfir (Young Lion) to Equador, the U.S. official reaction 
was one of anger. The U.S. turned it down on the basis of 
an agreement on the sales of supplies (particularly that of 
General Electric J-79 engines) that Israel required permis- 
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sion from the U.S. in order to export to a third country. 
Furthermore, the U.S. began to treat Israel Aircraft Indus¬ 
tries (IAI) as a tough, prospective competitor in the world 
market. Accordingly, getting license arrangements with the 
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U.S. aerospace companies became extremely difficult." 
Sensing the international position of the U.S., the 
British government has intentionally avoided confronting 
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the U.S. aerospace industry in this sensitive market. In 
any case, after World War II, Britain was not in a position 
to vex the U.S. by exporting arms to the Third World. The 
same was true of West Germany, Japan, and Italy. France un¬ 
der General de Gaulle was probably the only country which 
was able and willing to do so. This left the U.S. aerospace 
in a virtually monopolistic position in the world market for 
military aircraft. 
With the Kennedy Administration, in 1961, the Pentagon 
was swiftly changed by the personality of the new Secretary 
of Defense, Robert McNamara. Ke, with a Ford Motor back¬ 
ground, was determined to run the Pentagon in a business-like 
fashion. So he attempted to standardize weapon systems not 
only domestically but internationally, in particular among 
the NATO countries. For instance, the NATO countries employ¬ 
ed fourteen different types of small-arms and ammunition, 
while the Communist block used one. In the process of 
standardization, he insisted on unifying the system with 
that of the U.S. since American arms were the most advanced 
and the most economical with the biggest domestic market. 
Second, the Kennedy Administration was deeply worried 
about the deficit in balance of payments, which amounted to 
$3 billion.36 At the beginning of his presidency, Kennedy 
told the NATO allies that they must pay for their arms. 
During 1961 a task force headed by McGeorge Bundy and Paul 
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Nitze investigated the problem and decided to set up a spe¬ 
cial group inside the Pentagon. It was called the Interna¬ 
tional Logistics Negotiations(ILN), but it was actually an 
37 
organization for selling arms. 
It was now that the government was urging the industry 
to sell. The ILN, persuaded foreign governments to buy 
arms, and the U.S. companies to sell them. Soon the U.S. 
was selling an average of $2 billion in arms each year. 
This was more than twice the value of the arms given away in 
38 
grant aid. The aerospace products amounted to more than 
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60 per cent of the total arms exports. 
The Northrop Corporation is a good example of direct 
governmental support for export promotion. In 1968, its 
contract to produce T-38 trainers for the Air Force was about 
to expire. The Freedom Fighter, a fighter version of T-38, 
was becoming harder and harder to market overseas due to its 
limited range and speed. By some means, Congressman Rivers, 
then chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, persuad¬ 
ed the Pentagon and Congress to appropriate $28 million for 
improving the fighter.^ Furthermore, the Pentagon placed 
an initial order of 325 F-5Es or International Fighters in 
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order to set the project in motion. 
Gradually this new improved fighter gained the reputa¬ 
tion of being the most economical fighter in the world. It 
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is reputed to be a match for a MIG-21 in combat. Yet, with 
a fly-away cost of $2 million, it costs less than any other 
/ 0 
modem supersonic fighter in the world. International 
Fighters have been exported to twenty-two countries including 
Switzerland, Canada, Korea, and Norway. In Washington it 
was regarded as a key instrument of foreign policy providing 
links with the Third World. It has thus contributed $2 bil¬ 
lion to the U,S, balance of payments. So the F-5E became 
the most successful arms export for the U.S. since McNamara's 
doctrines of selling arms rather than giving arms was initiat- 
If the case of Northrop was due to the success of the 
overt governmental promotion of an aerospace export, then 
the case of General Dynamics is a brutal battle among the 
Allies, in particular, the U.S. and France. This stems 
from the urgent need for standardization in employing a re¬ 
placement for the F-104, the Starfightcr. However, this 
time the role of the government was more active and the pres- 
sures and lobbying came as much from diplomatic and defense 
officials as from the companies. The concerned governments 
decided that the matter was too crucial to be left to the 
hands of the aerospace tycoons because the choice would af¬ 
fect not only the future of aerospace industry, but the poli¬ 
tical character and the development of Europe. 
Originally, there were six contenders: BAC, Hawker 
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Siddeley, French Dassault, Swedish Saab, Northrop, and General 
Dynamics. But soon it became apparant that this was a battle 
between Dassault and General Dynamics as it was finally re¬ 
warded the U.S. Air Force contract in 1975 with the eventual 
prospect of orders for 650 planes.^ 
General Dynamics, however, was slow in getting into the 
international market. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, de¬ 
termined to press for standardization, urged the company into 
battle, promising the full weight of the Pentagon behind 
them.^ For the first five months of 1975 the contest for 
the NATO plane was at its peak. The Swedes offered tempting 
offset agreements and the French Government suggested the 
future integration of the whole European aircraft industry. 
The French government also assured other countries that France 
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would be thoroughly integrated with NATO. 
General Dynamics promised the Europeans a share in the 
profits and production of any planes sold to the Third World, 
which they estimated to be about two thousand planes. At 
the same time, the Pentagon overtly supported the company 
by reminding them that unless NATO is standardized, the fu¬ 
ture of the U.S. defense of Europe would be in jeopardy. 
President Ford personally discussed the matter with Belgian 
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Prime Minister when he visited Brussels for a NATO meeting. 
At last, in May 1975, Holland, Norway, and Denmark agreed 
to order the General Dynamics' F-16. The Belgians were still 
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split because of the delicate political situation existing 
between the Walloons and the Flemish. Then Schlesinger in¬ 
vited the Belgian Minister of Defense to Washington and point¬ 
ed out that the four countries would probably get back their 
whole initial investment by producing more planes for the 
Third World. He also offered to buy $30 million worth of 
Belgian machine-guns, which are made in French speaking Bel¬ 
gium. ^ Finally on June 6, Belgium announced the decision 
to buy the American plane. The Europeans paid for American 
technology, contributing as much as half-a-million dollars 
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to the development costs of each plane. 
These anecdotal examples demonstrated the importance of 
the role of the government in exporting aerospace products. 
This does not mean, of course, that the technological fac¬ 
tors are not important. Nevertheless, the influence of 
public policy overshadows the remaining factors which may 
have some influence over the decision making. In the real 
world of politics, some influence may be only as good as 
none. 
This active export policy along with other public policy 
changed the pattern of the U.S. foreign trade substantially 
during the last half a century. Table 28 exhibits the ex¬ 
port structure of key commodities in the U.S. during the per 
iod from 1910 to 1975. In the pre World War I period, cot¬ 
ton export comprises 58 per cent of the total export of eight 
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Table 28. U.S. Export Pattern of Key Commodities 
1910 to 1975 
Millions of Dollars 












1910 450 38 48 62 11 107 60 776 
(58) (5) (6) (8) (1) (14) (8) - (100) 
1920 1136 245 597 279 303 593 498 1 3,652 
(31) (7) (2) (8) (8) (16) (14) - (100) 
1930 497 145 88 66 279 495 139 9 1,713 
(29) (8) (5) (4) (16) (29) (8) (0.5) (100) 
1940 213 44 11 22 254 310 516 312 1,682 
(13) (3) (1) (1) (15) (18) (31) (19) (100) 
1950 1024 250 405 43 723 499 472 242 3,653 
(28) (7) (ID (1) (20) (14) (13) (7) (100) 
1960 980 379 1029 84 1270 463 635 1330 6,175 
(16) (6) (17) (1) (21) (8) (10) (22) (100) 
1970 372 481 1112 147 3245 433 1188 3397 10,430 
(4) (5) (11) (1) (31) (5) (11) (33) (100) 
1975 991 853 5293 491 8192 907 2382 7792 26,901 
(4) (3) (20) (2) (30) (3) (9) (29) (100) 
Sources: Compiled from U.S. Department or Commerce, Bureau 
of Census, Historical'Statistics of the U.S., Colon- 
ial times to 1958, 'Washington, D.C. , i960, p. 5^6; 
Ibid. 1975. and Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 
Washington, D.C.” 1976. 
key commodities. 3ut in 1975, it consists cr only 4 per 
cent of the total while aerospace export ^r.crsiSec --— 
less than 1 per cent in 1920 to 29 per cent or the total. 
One thing to note is that real price cr cotton steac../ 
decreased during the period. Thus it the -.S. - - -/n 
cotton extort which was comparatively advantageous, i — 
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foreign exchange earning power would have been greatly de¬ 
teriorated. From the British point of view, it would have 
been much better if the U.S. concentrate on agricultural 
production with its vast fertile land while she specialize 
on high technology - high unit value industry such as aero¬ 
space. Considering this, it is not surprising that the 
most ardent advocates of comparative advantage theory have 
been produced by Britain. 
6. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Of the many factors which differentiated the perfor¬ 
mance of the U.S. aerospace industry from that of its Bri¬ 
tish counterpart is the size of government procurement. 
Size is a crucial factor in improving productivity and cost 
reduction in the industry because of its consequential 
learning effect. The phenomenon of learning in the manu¬ 
facturing process first attracted serious attention during 
World War II.^ Since then it has become an increasingly 
familiar concept particularly in the aircraft industry. 
In any type of work as workers become familiar with 
the peculiarities of a new job through repetition, the time 
they take to accomplish it progressively decreases. Pro¬ 
gressive improvement in method also contributes to cost re¬ 
duction. Thus a learning curve can be derived by plotting 
the man-hours required to produce a unit against quantity. 
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It shows that for each increment in the quantity produced, 
there is a corresponding percentage reduction in man-hours 
per unit. For a typical airframe construction, if the 
first unit requires 1,000 man-hours, the time required by 
successive units will be as shown in the following table. 
Table 29 Kan-hours on a Typical Learning Curve 
in Aircraft Production 
Number of unit Man-hours per unit Cumulative average 
Man-hours per unit 
1 1,000 1,000 
2 800 900 
3 702 834 
4 640 785 
5 596 748 
10 477 631 
20 381 524 
30 335 467 
40 305 430 
50 284 402 
100 227 327 
200 182 264 
300 159 232 
400 145 212 
500 135 198 
1000 108 159 
Source: Ministry of Technology, Productivity of the National 
Aircraft Effort, London, Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1969. 
As man-hours for successive units decrease, so does 
the average hours for all units produced, as column 3 of 
Table 29 shows. The decrease in the unit and cumulative 
average man-hours is most notable in the smaller units 
i 
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stages. As the number of units produced increases the 
productivity improvement gradually becomes smaller and 
smaller. This is shown more clearly when the learning 
curve is plotted as in Graph 3. Consequently, when we 
compare productivity it makes a great difference whether 
we are referring to the production of 10 units or 1,000 
units. 
With regard to the number of units produced the U.S. 
and Britain are incomparable. In 1976 the U.S. aerospace 
industry delivered 16,605 units while its British counter¬ 
part delivered only 353 units.^ This is mainly due to 
the contrasting size of defense procurement of the respec¬ 
tive governments. As the following Table 30 indicates, 
the defense budget of British government is a fraction of 
that of the U.S. However, it should be stressed that there 
are at least three different official sources of statistics 
on the aerospace industry and all three are consistently 
inconsistent to each other. The three are Business Moni¬ 
tor, a British government statistical publication, Depart¬ 
ment of Industry and the Society of British Aerospace Com¬ 
panies. What is more, the Annual Abstract of Statistics, 
published by Central Statistics Office, further confuses 
the situation. Thus, as a compromise median number of 
the two extremeties was chosen as a representative number. 
From Table 30 we can see that the size of British 










Number of Units 
Source: Ministry of Technology, Productivity of the National 
Aircraft Effort, London: Her Maiesty s Stationery 
Office, 1969” 
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Table 30. The Proportion of Government Procurement to the 
Aerospace Industry Sales in the U.S. and Britain 
1960 to 1976 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Year 






% Industry Government 
Sales Procurement % 
1960 1.2 .5 44 17.3 13.6 79 4 
1961 1.4 .6 43 18.0 14.5 81 4 
1962 1.3 . 6 43 19.2 15.7 82 4 
1963 1.3 .6 47 20.1 16.8 84 4 
1964 1.4 . 6 43 20.6 17.9 87 3 
1965 1.6 . 6 38 20.7 15.9 77 4 
1966 1.6 .6 35 24.6 18.3 74 3 
1967 1.6 .5 32 27.3 20.1 74 3 
1968 1.6 .5 31 29.0 21.4 74 2 
1969 1.7 .4 26 26.1 20.5 79 2 
1970 2.2 .4 19 24.9 18.7 75 2 
1971 2.5 N. A. N.A. 22.2 15.3 69 N.A. 
1972 3.0 .9 29 22.8 15.9 70 5 
1973 3.8 1.3 N.A. 24.8 15.3 62 8 
1974 N. A. 1.8 N.A. 26.4 15.2 58 12 
1975 N. A. 1.9 N.A. 28.4 15.9 56 12 
1976 N. A 2.4 N.A. 29.3 16.2 • 55 15 
Sources: Compiled from British Industry Today; Aerospace, 
London, 1972, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, An¬ 
nual Abstract of Statistics, 1976, Interavia, Sep- 
tember 1975, and Aerospace Industries Association 
of America, Aerospace Facts and figures, 1977/78 , 
Washington, D.C., 1977. 
government’s procurement is about 3 per cent of that of 
the U.S. government. However, this has changed in the 
1970's since the U.S. government procurement substantially 
decreased. It is also noticeable that the U.S. aerospace 
industry is twice as dependent upon government procurement 
as the British aerospace industry. This indicates that 
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Table 31. The Proportion of Export to the Industry Sales 
of the U.S. and British Aerospace Industries 
1960 to 1975 

















1960 1.2 .4 34 17.3 1.7 10 23 
1961 1.4 .4 31 18.0 1.7 9 25 
1962 1.3 .3 26 19.2 1.9 10 17 
1963 1.3 .2 20 20.1 1.6 8 15 
1964 1.4 .2 18 20.6 1.6 8 15 
1965 1.6 .4 26 20.7 1.6 8 26 
1966 1.6 .5 32 24.6 1.7 7 31 
1967 1.6 .5 30 27.3 2.2 8 22 
1968 1.6 .7 45 29.0 3.0 10 23 
1969 1.7 .7 44 26.1 3.1 12 24 
1970 2.2 .7 31 24.9 3.4 14 20 
1971 2.5 .9 34 22.2 4.2 19 20 
1972 3.0 1.1 37 22.8 3.8 17 29 
1973 3.8 1.5 39 24.8 5.1 21 30 
1974 N. A. 1.8 N.A. 26.4 7.1 27 26 
1975 N. A. 2.3 N.A. 8.4 7.8 27 30 
1976 N. A. N.A. N.A. 29.3 7.9 27 N.A. 
Sources: British Industry Today; Aerospace, Her Majesty's Sta- 
tionery Office, London, 1960-1976.Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 
1960-1976, Interavia, September 1976, Aerospace In¬ 
dustries Association of America, Aerospace Facts and 
Figures , 1977/1978 , Washington, D.C~T, 1977 . 
the British industry depends more upon the exports. Table 
31 shows the proportion of exports to the industry sales of 
both countries. This demonstrates that the Britain has 
been forced to sell arms to arm her own forces because of 
the small size of government procurement. Table 31 also 
indicates that the U.S. aerospace industry is increasingly 
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dependent upon export sales while the proportion of govern¬ 
ment procurement is steadily decreasing as was indicated in 
the previous table 30. At the same time, the relative mar¬ 
ket position of the British aerospace industry compared to 
the U.S. aerospace industry has improved. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
1. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem assumes that comparative 
advantage causes and determines the pattern of international 
trade.^ But is comparative advantage really a cause of 
international trade or is it just a result of it? Or 
are both international trade and comparative advantage the 
result of something else? Although this causality has 
been taken for granted due to its intuitive appeal, the 
implication of the causation can hardly be exaggerated 
since the future pattern of trade and the developmental 
strategy of any economy will depend upon it. 
In a state of global inflation, only an industry with 
the inelastic price elasticity of demand for its product 
can raise the relative price level of its product suffi¬ 
ciently to improve the real income. Therefore, only an 
economy with a high technology - high unit value industrial 
base can better the income and employment levels of its 
people through export expansion. Accordingly, only in 
2 
this sense, can export be truly an 'engine of growth'. 
The theory of comparative advantage, however, directs an 
economy to concentrate on an industry which it is relatively 
best at. This leads to wider gap between a developed eco¬ 
nomy and a developing one by further reinforcing the state 
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of comparative advantage. 
If comparative advantage theory were right, the prewar 
U.S. would have been better off by remaining a predominantly 
agricultural economy indefinitely while Britain concentrated 
on technology-intensive industry such as the aircraft indus¬ 
try. But the U.S. aircraft industry took the opposite 
course. This diffiance of the U.S. aircraft industry and 
government turned out to be the cornerstone of American 
leadership in the postwar period. Again Europe in the 
1970’s took a similar action in the development of the aero¬ 
space industry. All these contradict what comparative 
advantage theory has put forth for the last two centuries. 
The basic objective of this study is to critically 
examine the export pattern of the U.S. aerospace industry 
in light of international trade theory to substantiate that 
the real driving force of international trade is not com¬ 
parative advantage but the concerted will of entrepreneur 
and government to expand the market, thus improving the 
productivity and the income level. In the process of de¬ 
termining what to export, an industry with a high potentia¬ 
lity of earning power and a high strategic value in a poli- 
ticoeconomic sense, has a high priority. 
Once the export is determined, the state of compara¬ 
tive advantage is changeable through various public poli¬ 
cies. This is why comparative advantage seems to dictate 
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the pattern of international trade on the surface. In re¬ 
ality, however, comparative advantage is only a result of 
the interaction between public policy and the entrepreneurs 
adaptability to a changing economic reality. 
In a passive economy dominated by the trade of crude 
commodities, comparative advantage seems especially fixed 
and vested. But in the complex world we live in today, 
this is more determined by public policy than a passive 
factor endowment which was stressed so much by the compara¬ 
tive advantage advocates since factor endowment can be 
changed by public policy. For example, a $20 million jet 
fighter is nothing more than seven tons of steel and alu¬ 
minum plates which would probably cost less than one thou¬ 
sandth of its price. Would natural factor endowments af¬ 
fect the state of comparative advantage? Even other fac¬ 
tors such as capital and skilled labor are changeable by 
the public policies of resource allocation and systematic 
training. A generally capital deficient economy can have 
a capital intensive industrial base by concentrating its 
resources. Thus it does not make any more sense to analy¬ 
ze international trade through factor endowments than to 
judge a human being in terms of his height. 
All these factors lead to the hypotheses of this study 
1. The comparative advantage is not a factor which 
is vested and fixed; 
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2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly 
changed by the interaction of public policy and 
the entrepreneurs' adaptability to their changing 
economic reality; 
3. Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving 
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬ 
tor resulting from exogeneous efforts; 
4. The active driving force of international trade 
and the determinant of international trade pattern 
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to 
improve the income and employment levels through 
market expansion. 
In order to substantiate these hypotheses, the growth 
of the U.S. aerospace industry and its export pattern were 
critically examined in conjunction with U.S. public policy. 
By doing so this study explore the crucial role of the go¬ 
vernment in changing the state of comparative advantage be¬ 
tween the U.S. and British aerosapce industries. 
2. REVIEW OF STUDY 
In chapter two, three main lines of thought on inter¬ 
national trade were examined; protectionism, price theory, 
and income theory. Protectionism is by no means a rigor¬ 
ous school. Yet its persistent influence on actual policy 
making process, suggests that it should not be ignored. 
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However, the resulting high cost to an economy as a whole 
in the long run makes it self-defeating. 
Price theory begins with Adam Smith's absolute advan¬ 
tage theory. But the real spurt was after the conception 
of comparative advantage by Torrens and Ricardo. This is 
further refined by Heckscher and Ohlin into the factor en¬ 
dowment theory. Samuelson and Meade expand Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory into multi-dimensional model. There are further re¬ 
finements of the price theory with the introduction of 
technology, competition, transportation, and economies of 
scale. Nevertheless, price theory presents only a limited 
scope of production and cost neglecting demand and income 
sides. 
Income theory is concerned with the multiplier-acceler¬ 
ator effects of income and the balance of trade effects gen¬ 
erated by exports. This, however, was insufficient in ex¬ 
plaining the widening gap between the income level of a de¬ 
veloped economy and that of a developing one which is equally 
or even more export-oriented than the former. Thus income 
theory was further ameliorated by the introduction of a 
terms of trade factor. 
Despite all these, contemporary international theory 
lacks an explanation of the active cause of international 
This is due to the fact that it deals with the trade. 
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symptoms rather than the actors in economic reality. In 
the real world, the true actor is Man himself. Conse¬ 
quently, his value system, mentality, physical dimension, 
and social institutions direct the destiny of the world he 
lives in. Eventually, these would extend into public po¬ 
licy ranging from foreign policy to tax policy. These 
policies constantly change the external factors of produc¬ 
tion and consumption. This study has named this, the dy¬ 
namic externality theory. Thus, no matter how difficult 
it is to handle these factors, these must be included in 
any viable theory. 
In chapter three, the growth of the U.S. aerospsce 
industry from its birth to today was examined. In every 
stage of breakthrough, various policy measures implemented 
by the government and the industry's adaptation to it was 
closely examined. 
In chapter four, the impact of public policy on the 
exports of the aerosapce industry was analyzed from various 
aspects: research and development, government financing and 
tax, export, and government procurement policies. For the 
purpose, the industry data of the U.S. and the Western 
Europe, especially that of the British aerospace industry 
were widely used to do a comparative analysis. 
From chapter two we learned that international trade 
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theory is based upon comparative advantage. However, this 
case study suggests that both cost of production and demand, 
in so far as aerospace industry is concerned, are essen¬ 
tially determined by public policy which is in return deter¬ 
mined by the interaction of the value system of people and 
political institution. As we saw production cost and 
supply curves are dependent upon public expenditure for 
research and development, tax policy, and government pro¬ 
curement. At the same time demand itself is grossly de¬ 
termined by public policy since government procurement is 
more than a half of the total industry sales and export is 
also directed by the foreign and military policies of the 
government. 
A significant corollary of this is that when the U.S. 
government supports research and development, and thus im¬ 
proves productivity, the state comparative advantage of the 
industry and export pattern are changed. Likewise, if an 
economy concentrate on the limited areas of the industry, 
it by virtue of specialization may be in a position to com¬ 
pete with the other established economy as the U.S. did 
successfully with Britain. For example, Israel and Brazil 
are becoming increasingly competitive in the world market. 
Also the Western Europe increased its market share through 
aggressive public procurement and R & D policies. 
What they have in common with each other can be summed 
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up as following: 
1. Much of R & D activities are funded by the govern¬ 
ment. In case of the U.S. aerospace industry, it 
comes up to 79 per cent of the total R & D expendi¬ 
ture ; 
2. Government directly and indirectly finances the 
industry by accelerated depreciation allowances, 
stabilized profit level, government furnished 
equipments and plants, and various incentive 
measures for efficient contractors; 
3. Government covertly and overtly promotes the ex¬ 
port through the agencies of both foreign and mi¬ 
litary services. This government promotion acti¬ 
vities intensify when the balance of payment posi¬ 
tion is worsen; 
4. The size of government procurement is crucial to 
attain sufficient economies of scale, since govern¬ 
ment procurement consists 60 to 80 per cent of the 
total industry sales in case of the U.S.; 
5. Government guides the industry through long range 
planning and coordination, thus keeping the indus¬ 
try as a whole viable. 
Therefore, the active public policies of concerned govern¬ 
ment were indispensable in nurturing high technology indus¬ 
try such as aerospace industry. Also each change in pub¬ 
lic policy may shift the whole external conditions of supply 
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and demand. Consequently, we should incorporate the 
various aspects of public policy into our consideration 
no matter how difficult it may be. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The hypotheses of this study were: 
1. Comparative advantage is not a factor which is 
vested and fixed; 
2. The state of comparative advantage is constantly 
changed by the interaction of public policy and 
the entrepreneurs' adaptability to their changing 
economic reality; 
3. Comparative advantage is not a sufficient driving 
force of international trade but a necessary fac¬ 
tor resulting from exogenous efforts; 
4. The active driving force of international trade 
and the determinant of international trade pattern 
are the wills of entrepreneurs and government to 
improve the income and employment levels through 
market expansion. 
The above hypotheses were substantiated by the study. 
These may not be universal, but as far as the aerospace in¬ 
dustries in the U.S. and the Western Europe are concerned, 
the above hypotheses are viable throughout seventy years of 
their historv. 
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Also other hypotheses were suggested by the study. 
Such hypotheses deserve further analysis: 
1. An oligopolistic industry regulated to secure the 
public interest of a nation will affect the patterns 
of foreign trade of potential competitors. The 
benefits of the trade may or may not be advanta¬ 
geous to the welfare of the affected countries; 
2. A small country, by selective specialization, may 
successfully compete with a larger, better endowed 
country, if the small country concentrates its 
efforts in the limited segment of the market; 
3. The public policy of an exporting country may per¬ 
sistently affect production conditions of given 
commodities regardless of the natural endowments 
of the concerned country. Such adverse effects 
may result in institutionalized adjustments in 
trading countries and may radically affect the con¬ 
ceptions of comparative advantage; 
4. Natural endowment as a basis for comparative ad¬ 
vantage may be grossly affected by the market 
structure and also by access to government assis¬ 
tance . 
The benefits of international trade may, by the 
public policy of a country, °.ccure that country 
to a greater degree than if comparative advantage 
were the major determinant of trade. 
5. 
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The implication of this study is that developmental 
strategy of any economy needs not to be bounded by the 
present state of comparative advantage. This then opens 
a whole new horizon of the theory of economic development. 
Export to be a true ’engine of the growth' export item 
should be of high technology - high unit value industry. 
Otherwise an economy heavily relying on low technology - 
low unit value exports would do nothing but lower the liv¬ 
ing cost of other economies which concentrate on technology 
intensive industries. 
This does not mean that every economy should go into 
every technology-intensive industry. It must be extremely 
careful in selecting an industry to which a whole economy 
is to concentrate its resources and manpower. The tactics 
and criteria of the selection process, however, is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
4. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY 
This study is exploratory. Consequently, to gain 
further insights into the implementable theory in interna¬ 
tional trade, this should be extended over more external 
factors which may be less significant than the ones includ¬ 
ed here. Also quantification of variables wherever possi¬ 
ble with sensibly disaggregate data would enhance the appli 
cability of the study to the policy making process. 
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Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that every pro¬ 
spective variable must be scrutinized in light of causality. 
Furthermore, business and economic sciences as a whole 
should be more concerned with actors rather than symptoms. 
In other words the economist should not be afraid of tack¬ 
ling the subjective issues involved with ideological contro¬ 
versies. The development of business and economic sciences 
is characterized by the quantification with value-free vari¬ 
ables. This may be partially due to the boisterous idelo- 
gical controversies during the last century. 
Unlike the physical sciences, however, the social sci¬ 
ences cannot escape from subjectivity since the true actor 
of social phenomena is Man himself. Thus social scientists 
should accept a value system as the backbone of the theoreti¬ 
cal framework no matter how difficult it is to comprehend. 
Also institutions, as a social embodiment of Man himself, 
should be considered as more of a living organism rather 
than as of a indiscriminative mechanism of variables. 
After all,'there is no permanent and universal rule 
or value system in social phenomena, except self-preserva¬ 
tion and self-realization. Only this must be permanent 




1. Heckscher-Ohlin theory is not the only theory of inter¬ 
national trade prevalent in the standard literature. 
Linder, for example, in his book An Essay on Trade and 
Trans formation argued that the Heckscher-Ohlin Factor 
Proportion Theory does not explain most trade between 
developed countries; but rather that the existence of 
economies of scale in manufactured goods allow de¬ 
veloped countries to specialize in particular product 
lines within various industries. Consequently, de¬ 
veloped countries tend to export and import different 
specific products within the same industries such as 
automobiles and electric appliances. Keesing and 
other economists have stressed the importance of re¬ 
search and development in determining the patterns of 
trade. However, this study goes one step further 
by stating that all these mentioned factors are the 
results of active forces such as public policy and 
the will of the people. Accordingly, symptoms and 
actors should be clearly differentiated and the direc¬ 
tion of causality should be discerned. 
D.H. Robertson, "The Future of International Trade," 





Allen, William R. , International Trade Theory: Hume to Ohlin 
New York: Random House, 1967. ’ 
American Economic Association, Surveys of Economic Theory, 
Growth and Development, London: Macmillan, 1955. 
American Economic Association, Readings in the Theory and 
International Trade, Homewood: Richard D. Erwin, Inc., 
_• Readings in International Economics, Homewood: 
Richard D. Erwin Inc., 1568. 
Asher, H., Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe In¬ 
dustry, Santa Monica: the Rand Corporation. 1956. 
Baldwin, Robert E., International Trade and Finance Readings, 
Boston: Little Brown, 1973. 
Berkowitz, Marvin, The Conversion of Military Oriented Re¬ 
search to Civilian Uses, New York: Praeger Special 
Studies in U.S. Economic and Social Development. 
Bhattacharya, Anindya K., Foreign Trade and International 
Development, Lexington: Lexington Books; 1976. 
Bhaghwati, Jagish, International Trade; Selected Reading, 
London: Penguin Books, 1969. 
_, Trade. Tariffs, and Growth; Essays in Interna¬ 
tional Economics. Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1969. 
Biederman, H.R. , International Trade and Cooperation in 
Aerospace Products, Sunnyville: Lockheed Aircraft 
Corporation, 1968. 
Bulloch, James, Defense Contract Costing: The State of the 
Art, National Association of Accountants, 1972. 
Caves, Richard E., International Trade, International In¬ 
vestment and Imperfect Markets, International Finance 
Section, Princeton: Princeton University, 1974. 
_, Trade and Economic Structure, Models and Methods, 
C amb ridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
171 
Chacholiades, Miltiades, The Pure Theory of International 
Trade, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1973 
Cline, W.R. and Hays, L., Competitiveness, Rankings and 
Disaggregated Industrial Trade Liberalization Effects; 
U.S. Department of Treasury, 1973. 
Corden, W.M., Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974. 
Corden, W.M. , Recent Development in the Theory of Intema- 
tional Trade, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
T9637 
Ellsworth, Paul T., The International Economy, London: Mac¬ 
millan, 1970. 
Fearon, P., The British Airframe Industry and the State 1918- 
1935, London: Economic Historical Review, 1974. 
Findlay, Ronald E., International Trade and Development 
Theory, New York! Columbia University Press, 1973. 
Freeman, Myrick A., International Trade: An Introduction to 
Method and Theory, New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
Fox Ronald J. , Arming &nerica: How the U.S. Bugs Weapons, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19747 
Haberler, Gottfried, A Survey of International Trade Theory, 
International Finance Section, Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1961. 
_, Growth and Balance in World Trade: A Challenge to 
American Foreign Economic Policy, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1958 . 
, International Trade and Economic Development, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press~ I960. 
, The Theory of International Trade with its Appli¬ 
cation to Commercial Policy , New York: Dodge Co. , 1936. 
Gray, Peter H., A Generalized Theory of International Trade, 
New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers! 1976. 
Javits, Jacob, Hitch Charles, Bums Arthur F., Defense sec¬ 
tor & the American Economy, New York: New York Univer¬ 
sity Press, 1968. 
172 
Johnson, HArry G., International Trade and Economic Growth, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. 
Kenen Peter B. (ed.), International Trade and Finance, 
Frontier for Research, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975. 
Kenen, Peter. B, The Open Economy; Essays on International 
Trade and Finance, New York: Columbia University Press. 
vnnr. 
Kindleberger, Charles P., Foreign Trade and the National 
Economy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 
_, International Economics, Homewood: Richard D. Ir¬ 
win Inc., 1958. 
Knudsen, Odin, Trade Instability and Economic Development; 
An Empirical Study, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1975. 
Kravis, Irving B., Price Competitiveness in World Trade, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 
Kreinin, Mordechai, International Economics; A Policy Ap¬ 
proach , New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971. 
Leighton, Richard, Economics of International Trade, New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 
Levine Sumner N., Financial Analysist's Handbook I, II, 
Homewood, Dow-Jones-Irwin Inc. 
Linder, Staffan, B., An Essay on Trade and Transformation, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961. 
Lipsey, R.E., Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade 
of the United States, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963. 
Lydall, Harold F., Trade and Employment: A Study of the Ef¬ 
fects of Trade Expansion on Employment in Developing 
and Developed Countries, International Labor Office, 
vnr.- 
Machlup, Fritz, International Trade and the National In¬ 
come Multiplier, New York: Kelley. 
Magee, Stephen P., International Trade and Distortion of 
Fact or Markets" Dekker, 1976. 
173 
Mansfield, Edwin (ed.), Defense, Science, and Public Policy 
An Introduction, New York: W.W. Norton STCo. , 1968. ' 
Marschak, T., Glennan, T., and Summers, R., Strategy for 
R&D, Santa Monica: the Rand Corporation" 1967? 
Meier, Gerald, International Trade and International In¬ 
equality. 
Michaely, Michael, Concentration in International Trade, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland Publication Co., 1962. 
Miernyk, William H., Impact of the Space Program on a Local 
Economy. 
Miller, R., and Swers, D., The Technical Development of 
Modem Aviation, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
1968. 
Monroe, Wilbur F., International Trade Policy in Transition 
Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975. 
Moody's Industrial Mannuals, New York: 1941-1976. 
Morrall, John F., Human Capital, Technology, and the Role 
of the United States in International Trade, Miami: 
University of Florida Press, 1972. 
National Science Foundation, Research and Development in 
Industry, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
Nau, Henry R. , National Politics & International Technology 
Nuclear Development in Western Europe, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 
Neisser Haus and Modigliani Franco, National Incomes and 
International Trade, A Quantitalve Analysis, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, 1953. 
Nurkse, Ragnar, Patterns of Trade and Development, Oxford: 
Basil and Blackwell, 1962. 
Ohlin, Bertil, Interregional and International Trade, Cam¬ 
bridge : Harvard University Press” 1967. 
Patil, Lila T., The Evolution and Growth Patterns of Inter¬ 
national Trade" Calcutta: World Press, 1970. 
Peck, M., and Scherer, F., The Weapon Acquisition Process: 
An Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962. 
174 
Phillips, Almarin, Technology & Market Structure: A Study 
of the Aircraft"Industry, Lexingtion, Lexington. 
Books. 
Plowden Report, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Aircraft Industry, London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1964-1965. ^ 
Proximire, William, Report from Wasteland: America's Mili¬ 
tary-Industrial' Complex, New York: Praeger, 1970. 
Ramaswami, V.K., Trade and Development; Essays in Economics, 
Lon don: Allen and Union, 1971. 
Sachs, Ignacy, Foreign Trade and Economic Development of 
Underdeveloped Country, New York: Asia Publishing 
House, 1965. 
Servan-Schreiber, J.J., The American Challenge, New York: 
1969. 
Shone Robert, The Pure Theory of International Trade, Lon¬ 
don: Macmillan, 1972. 
Sherer, Frederic M. , The Weapon Acquisition Process and 
Economic Incentives, Boston, Harvard Business School, 
- 
Simonson, G.R., The History of the American Aircraft Indus¬ 
try: An Anthology, Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1968. 
Sire, Ljubo, Outline of International Trade: Commodity Flows 
and Division of Production between Countries, London: 
Weidenfeld 6c Nicolson, 1973. 
Snider, Delbert A., Introduction to International Economics, 
Homewood: Richard t). Erwin Inc. , 196 7. 
Sodersten, Bo, A Study of Economic Growth and International 
Trade, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964. 
, International Economics, New York: Harper & Row, 
I9T0. 
Streeten (ed.), Trade Strategies for Development, Cambridge: 
Sambridge University Press. 
Theberge, James D. (ed.), Economics of Trade and Develop¬ 
ment , New York: John Wiley Sc Sons , 1968. 
175 
The Times, The Times 1000, Times Newspapers Ltd., London: 
New Printing House Square, 1977 
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, FAA Statistical Hand¬ 
book of Aviation, Washington, D.C. 
Van Meerhaeghe, International Economics, London: Longman, 
1972. 
Vanek,Jaroslav, International Trade: Theory and Economic 
Policy,Homewood: Richard D. Irwin Inc. , 1962. 
Vernon, Raymond, The Technology Factor in International 
Trade, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 
Viner, Jacob, International Trade and Economic Development, 
Oxford, Clarenden Press, 1953. 
Weckstein, Richard S., Expansion of World Trade and the 
Growth of National Economies, New York: Harper & Row, 
- 
Weidenbaum, Murray L., The Economics of Peace Time Defense, 
New York: Praeger." 
Zook, Paul D., Economic Development and International Trade, 
A Perspective, Dallas, Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1959. 
ARTICLES 
Agapos, A.M. , and Dunlap, P.M. , "The Theory of Price Deter¬ 
mination in Government-Industry Relationships," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1970. 
Agapos, A.M., and Gallaway, L.E., "Defense Profits and the 
Renegotiation Board in the Aerospace Industry," 
Journal of Political Economy, September/October 1970. 
Albright, Joseph, "How to get a new Plane (and its Market) 
Off the Ground," New York Times Magazine, February 1976 
Baldwin, R.E., "Determinants of the Commodity Structure of 
U.S. Trade," American Economic Review, March 1971. 
Baron, D.P., "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding," 
American Economic Review, December 1974. 
176 
Batra, R., and Casas, F.R., "Economic Growth and Interna¬ 
tional Trade in an Imperfect Market Setting," Indian 
Economic Journal, July/September, 1973. 
Bohi, D.R., "Profit Performance in the Defense Industry," 
Journal of Political Economy, May 1973. 
Branch, B., "R&D and its Relation to Sales Growth," Journal 
of Economic Business, Winter 1973. 
_, "R&D Activity and Profitability; A Distributed Lag 
Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, September/Oc¬ 
tober, 1974. 
Branson, W.H., "U.S. Comparative Advantage: Some Further 
Results," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1971. 
Branson, W.K., and Junz, H.B., "Trends on U.S. Trade and 
Comparative Advantage," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1971. 
Carroll, Sidney L., "Profits in the Airframe Industry," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1972. 
Drake, Hudson B. , "Major DOD Procurement of War with Reality," 
Harvard Business Review, January 1970. 
Ellison A.P., & Stafford E.M., "The Order Relivery Lag in 
the World's Civil Aircraft Industry," Applied Econo¬ 
mics , March 1973. 
Fearon, P., "The Formative Years of the British Aircraft 
Industry; 1913-1924," Business History Review, Winter 
1969. 
_, "The British Airframe Industry: and the State in 
the Interwar Period," Economic History Review, Novem¬ 
ber 1975. 
Franz, W.W., "A Theoretical Model of the Employment Impacts 
of Defense Contracts and Private Orders with Empirical 
Applications to the Aircraft Industry," American Eco¬ 
nomist , Spring 1971. 
Freeman, C., and Young, A., "The Plastic Industry: A.Com¬ 
parative Study of Research and Innovation," National 
Institute Economic Review, November 1963. 
Gruber, W.H., Mehta, D., and Vernon, R., "The R&D Factor in 
International Trade and International Investment oi 
177 
U.S. Industries,” Journal of Political Economy, Feb¬ 
ruary 1967. 
Hansen,W.L., and Weisbrod, B.A.,: "Distributional Effects of 
Public Expenditure Programs," Public Finance, April 
1972. 
Hartley, Keith, "Development, Time Scales for British and 
American Military Aircraft," Scotish Journal of Poli¬ 
tical Economy, June 1972. 
_, "Estimating Military Aircraft Production Outlays: 
The British Experience," Economic Journal, December 
1969. 
_, "The Mergers in the U.K. Aircraft Industry, 1957- 
1960," Journal of R.oyal Aeronautical Society, Decem¬ 
ber 1965. 
_, "The U.K. Military Aircraft Market," Yorkshire 
Bulletin, May 1967. 
_, "Estimating Military Aircraft Production Outlays: 
The British Experience," Economic Journal, December 
1969. 
Hartley, K., & Corcoran, W.J., "Shortrun Employment Func¬ 
tion and Defense Contracts in the U.K., Aircraft 
Industry," Applied Economics, December 1975. 
Hoffmann, W.G., "The Share of Defense Expenditure in GNP: 
An International & Diachronic Comparison," German 
Economic Review, July 1969. 
Hufbauer, G.C., "The Impact of National.Characteristics and 
Technology on the Commodity Composition of Trade in 
Manufactured Goods," The Technology Factor in Interna¬ 
tional Trade, 1970. 
Hurtley, K., "The Export Performance of the British Aircraft 
Industry," Bulletin of Economics. November 1972. 
Jones, R.W., "The Role of Technology in the Theory of In¬ 
ternational Trade," The Technology Factor in Inter¬ 
national Trade, 1970. 
Keesing, D., "The Impact of Research and Development on 
U.S. Trade," Journal of Political Economy, February 
1967. 
178 
Kenen, P.B., "Nature, Capital, and Trade," Journal of Poli- 
tical Economy, October 1965, 
Kenen, P.B., "Skills, Human Capital, and Comparative Advan¬ 
tage," Education, Income, and Human Capital, 1970. 
Knecht, G.R., "Costing; Technological Growth and Generalized 
Learning Curves," Operations Research Quarterly, Sep¬ 
tember, 1974. 
Kraar, L., "Grumman," Fortune, February, 1976. 
Kravis, I.B., "Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities 
Between the 19th and 20th Centuries," Economic Journal, 
December 1970. 
Kurth, J.R., "The Political Economy of Weapons Procurement: 
the Follow-on Imperative," American Economic Review, 
May 1972. 
Leitenberg, M. , "The Dynamics of Military Technology Today," 
International Society Science Journal, 1973. 
Leonard, W.N., "R&D in Industrial Growth*Reply," Journal 
of Political Economy, September 1973. 
Leontief, W. , "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The 
American Capital Position Reexamined," Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society, September 1953. 
Lowinger, Thomas C., "The Technology Factor and the Export 
Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Industries," Eco¬ 
nomic Inquiry, June 1975. 
Melman, S., "10 Propositions on the War Economy," American 
Economic Review, May 1970. 
Morawetz, D., "Employment Implications of Industrializa¬ 
tions in Developing Countries: A Survey," Economic 
Journal, September, 1974. 
Murray, D.H. , and Phillips, B.J, , "Foreign Capital and Ex¬ 
port in Economic Development," Economic Record, Decem- 
er 1974. 
Myint, Hla, "The ’Classical Theory' of International Trade 
and the Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Journal. 
National Security Industrial Association, "New Approaches 
to Contracting," Report of Cost Reduction Study, 
June 1962. 
179 
Petith, H.C., "The Pattern of Trade in a Neoclassical 
Growth Model, with a General Saving Function," 
Journal of International Economics, November, 1974. 
Petrin, B.F., and Grub, P.D., "Product Management in High 
Technology Defense Industry Marketing," California 
Management Review, Spring 1973. 
Poirier, D.J., "The Determinants of Aerospace Profit Rates 
1951-1971," Southern Economic Journal, October 1974. 
Posner, M.V., "International Trade and Technical Change," 
Oxford Economic Papers, October, 1961. 
Possen, V.M., "Effectiveness of Government Expenditure in 
a Growth Framework," Canadian Journal of Economics, 
May 1975. 
Purvis, D.D., "Inflation and the terms of Trade," Journal 
of Political Economy, February 1975. 
Reichardt, O.H., "Industrial Concentration and World War II, 
A Note on the Aircraft Industry," Buisness Historical 
Review, Winter 1975. 
Rothschild, K.W., "Military Expenditure, Export and Growth," 
Kyklos, 1973. 
Stem,E & Tims, W. , "The Relative Bargaining Strength of 
Developing Countries," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, May 1975. 
Stigler, G.J., and Friedland, C., "Profits of Defense Con¬ 
tractors," American Economic Review, September 1971. 
Stobaugh, R.B., "The Neotechnology Account of International 
Trade: The Case of Petrochemicals,” The Product Life 
Cycle and International Trade, 1972. 
Sturmey, S.G., "Cost Curves and Pricing in Aircraft Produc¬ 
tion," Economic Journal, December 1964. 
Thomson, E.A., "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of 
Political Economy, July/August 1974. 
Vernon, R. , "International Investment and International 
Trade in the Product Cycle," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, May 1966. 
180 
Warren, D.S., "Program Choice in the Aerospace Industry," 
California Management Review, Summer 1972. 
Weston, J.F., and Jacoby, N.H., "Profit Standards," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1952. 

